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Abstract
We empirically examine the trade-o® theory of capital structure, allowing for
costly adjustment. After con¯rming that ¯nancing behavior is consistent with the
presence of adjustment costs, we use a dynamic duration model to show that ¯rms
behave as though adhering to a dynamic trade-o® policy in which they actively
rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. We ¯nd that ¯rms re-
spond to changes in their equity value, due to price shocks or equity issuances,
by adjusting their leverage over the two to four years following the change. The
presence of adjustment costs, however, often prevents this response from occurring
immediately, resulting in shocks to leverage that have a persistent e®ect. Our ev-
idence suggests that this persistence is more likely a result of optimizing behavior
in the presence of adjustment costs, as opposed to market timing or indi®erence.
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Abstract
We empirically examine the trade-o® theory of capital structure, allowing for
costly adjustment. After con¯rming that ¯nancing behavior is consistent with the
presence of adjustment costs, we use a dynamic duration model to show that ¯rms
behave as though adhering to a dynamic trade-o® policy in which they actively
rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. We ¯nd that ¯rms re-
spond to changes in their equity value, due to price shocks or equity issuances,
by adjusting their leverage over the two to four years following the change. The
presence of adjustment costs, however, often prevents this response from occurring
immediately, resulting in shocks to leverage that have a persistent e®ect. Our ev-
idence suggests that this persistence is more likely a result of optimizing behavior
in the presence of adjustment costs, as opposed to market timing or indi®erence.The trade-o® theory of capital structure posits that ¯rms have an optimal or target
debt-to-equity ratio that perfectly balances the costs and bene¯ts of debt ¯nancing. The
costs of debt ¯nancing include the potential for costly bankruptcy and agency con°icts.
The bene¯ts include the tax deductability of interest payments and the mitigation of free
cash °ow problems. While originally conceived as a static theory, a natural implication of
the trade-o® theory is the dynamic rebalancing of capital structure. Over time, both the
target and actual leverage of ¯rms may change as a result of changes in ¯rm characteristics
or market perturbations to the value of debt and equity. If this change results in a ¯rm's
actual capital structure deviating from the target, the trade-o® theory predicts that the
¯rm will adjust its capital structure in order to equate its actual leverage with the optimal
leverage.
One problematic aspect of the trade-o® theory and many corresponding empirical tests
is the assumption of costless adjustment. In the absence of adjustment costs, the trade-
o® theory predicts that ¯rms continuously adjust their capital structures to maintain the
value-maximizing leverage ratio. However, in the presence of such costs, ¯rms may not
¯nd it optimal to respond immediately to shocks that push them away from their target.
If the costs of such adjustments outweigh the bene¯ts, ¯rms will wait to recapitalize,
resulting in \extended excursions away from their targets" (Myers (1984)). Recognizing
these costs, ¯rms do not simply have an optimal level of leverage but an optimal range in
which they are inactive with respect to their ¯nancial policy. Indeed, Fischer et al. (1989)
show that even a small cost of recapitalization can result in long periods of inactivity.
The consequence of this view is that leverage will be persistent, in the sense that ¯rms
will not always respond to shocks that perturb their capital structure. Thus, observed
leverage may be a noisy measure of corporate ¯nancial policy, suggesting that one must
look elsewhere to uncover the motivation behind corporate capital structure.
The goal of this paper is to test the trade-o® theory, while allowing for costly ad-
justment. Speci¯cally, we examine corporate ¯nancing decisions in a dynamic duration
model and address three questions. First, is ¯nancing behavior consistent with the exist-
ing empirical evidence concerning adjustment costs (see, for example, Smith (1986), Lee
et al. (1996), and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000))? Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) estimate
equity and debt issuance cost functions that have several implications for the temporal
variation in issuance decisions. Additionally, most equity repurchases are governed by
SEC rule 10b-18, which restricts the size and frequency of such transactions (see Cook
et al. (2003)).
Second, do ¯rms make ¯nancing decisions that are consistent with a dynamic rebal-
1ancing of leverage, as implied by a trade-o® theory? In other words, we ask why ¯rms
make leverage adjustments when they do, as opposed to why ¯rms have di®erent leverage
ratios. In doing so, we are able to test a number of predictions concerning the dynamic
behavior of ¯nancial policy in the presence of adjustment costs, as generated by models
such as Fischer et al. (1989).1
Finally, what are the implications of costly adjustment for alternative explanations
of ¯nancing behavior based on recent empirical evidence? Studies by Baker and Wurgler
(2002) and Welch (2004) argue, contrary to the trade-o® theory, that ¯rms do not rebal-
ance their capital structure in response to equity issuances and shocks to equity values.
Studies by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender (2002) ¯nd that
¯rms' ¯nancial policies are best described by the pecking-order theory (Myers (1984) and
Myers and Majluf (1984)).
We begin by showing that ¯rms are inactive with respect to their ¯nancial policy a
majority of the time, but when they do issue or repurchase debt and equity, they do
so in clusters. In almost 75% of our sample's ¯rm-quarter observations, ¯rms neither
issue nor repurchase their own securities. However, ¯rms are still quite active, issuing
or repurchasing securities on average once a year. Further, when ¯rms do decide to
visit the capital markets they tend to do so in several closely spaced, often consecutive,
quarters. This temporal pattern in ¯nancing decisions is generally consistent with the
recent empirical evidence of Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), who show that debt and equity
issuance costs consist of both a ¯xed cost and a convex variable cost. It is also consistent
with the provisions of SEC rule 10b-18, which restricts the timing and amount of share
repurchases on any given day.
We then examine the motivations behind corporate ¯nancing decisions, which we
¯nd to be consistent with trade-o® behavior. More speci¯cally, we ¯nd that ¯rms are
signi¯cantly more likely to increase (decrease) leverage if their leverage is relatively low
(high), if their leverage has been decreasing (accumulating), or if they have recently
decreased (increased) their leverage. This dynamic rebalancing suggests that ¯rms behave
in a manner consistent with the trade-o® theory, as predicted by the model of Fischer
et al. (1989). If leverage lies within a target range, ¯rms are inactive with respect to
their capital structure. Only when leverage moves outside the target range do ¯rms
make rebalancing adjustments. This result is also consistent with the survey evidence
of Graham and Harvey (2001), which shows that managers are concerned with the costs
and bene¯ts of debt ¯nancing (credit ratings, cash °ow volatility and tax shields are
1See other studies Ju (2001), Ju et al. (2002) and Hennessy and Whited (2003), for example.
2\important" or \very important" to almost half of those CFOs surveyed). Finally, our
rebalancing result is consistent with previous empirical work that ¯nds mean reversion in
leverage (Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Roberts (2001) and Roper (2002)). It also explains
why the rate at which leverage reverts to its target is often characterized as slow;2 ¯rms
do not rebalance every period and when they do, it is to a target range, rather than a
speci¯c level. Hence, shocks to leverage have lasting e®ects despite trade-o® behavior.
Our results call into question not the ¯ndings, but the conclusions of Baker and Wur-
gler (2002) and Welch (2004), who argue that because leverage appears unresponsive to
various shocks, the trade-o® theory is an inappropriate description of corporate ¯nancial
policy. When we look more closely at their results, we ¯nd that the persistent behavior
of leverage revealed by their empirical tests is more likely due to adjustment costs, as op-
posed to market timing or indi®erence. Speci¯cally, we ¯nd that the e®ect of Baker and
Wurgler's key market timing variable on leverage attenuates in a signi¯cant manner as
adjustment costs decline, illustrating that adjustment costs appear to dictate the speed
at which ¯rms respond to shocks to leverage. Further, our nonparametric and dura-
tion analyses shows that the e®ect of equity issuances on ¯rms' leverage is erased within
two years by debt issuances. We also ¯nd that after simulating data from the dynamic
trade-o® model of Fischer et al. (1989), we obtain very similar empirical results as those
in Welch (2004). Additionally, our analysis shows that ¯rms respond to large positive
(negative) equity shocks by rebalancing their capital structure through debt issuances
(retirements), thereby erasing any impact on leverage within a few years.
Though we do not explicitly test the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984)
and Myers (1984), several of our results are consistent with its predictions. More prof-
itable ¯rms and ¯rms with greater cash balances are less likely to use external ¯nancing,
while ¯rms with large anticipated investment expenses are more likely to use external
¯nancing. Taken in conjunction with the recent evidence supporting the \modi¯ed" peck-
ing order (see Shyam-Sunder (1999) and Lemmon and Zender (2002)), our rebalancing
results suggest that both the bankruptcy costs associated with debt ¯nancing and the
information asymmetry costs associated with equity ¯nancing are important determi-
nants of capital structure decisions. However, more research focused speci¯cally on the
predictions of the pecking order, as in Lemmon and Zender (2002), for example, is needed
in order to distinguish between the pecking order and traditional trade-o® theories.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the trade-o®
theory in the presence of adjustment costs and its empirical implications. Section II
2See, for example, Fama and French (2002).
3discusses the data and sample selection procedure, in addition to presenting summary
statistics. Section III motivates the empirical approach. Section IV presents the estima-
tion results. Section V discusses alternative theories of capital structure and reconciles
our ¯ndings with previous evidence. Section VI concludes.
I. The Dynamic Trade-o® Theory
A. Leverage Dynamics
A.1. The Impact of Adjustment Costs
The trade-o® theory has a number of empirical implications that depend on which costs
and bene¯ts one associates with debt ¯nancing. Rather than focusing on the perceived
costs and bene¯ts, as done in most previous empirical work, we focus on the implications
for the dynamics of leverage adjustments, while controlling for any perceived costs and
bene¯ts. Our empirical measure of leverage is the ratio of the book value of total debt
to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.3
The trade-o® theory implies that ¯rms actively rebalance their capital structures by
increasing or decreasing their leverage in response to shocks that move them away from
their optimal leverage. Most empirical treatments have implicitly assumed that this
rebalancing is to a unique target level and that it takes place continuously through time
(i.e. every period).4 This assumption is the motivation behind the partial adjustment
model found in many studies.5 However, in the presence of a ¯xed or proportional
adjustment cost, continuous adjustment may no longer be optimal and the impact on
capital structure dynamics can be profound.
The e®ect of di®erent adjustment costs on the dynamic behavior of optimizing agents
has been show in many contexts including: inventory management (Harrison (1985)),
cash management (Miller and Orr (1966)), investment policy (Caballero and Engle
(1999), portfolio selection (Constantinides (1986)), and capital structure (Fischer et al.
3We repeat all of our analyses using book leverage, de¯ned as the ratio of total debt to the book
value of total assets. Our results and conclusions are una®ected.
4The absence of adjustment costs or a strictly convex adjustment cost function will generate such
behavior.
5See studies by Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Roberts (2001), Roper (2002) for explicit partial ad-
justment models. However, since the partial adjustment model is simply a reparameterization of a ¯rst
order autoregression, the models of Graham (1996) and others may also be interpreted as assuming a
continuous adjustment process.
4(1989)). The most apparent e®ect of adjustment costs is often periods of inactivity, as
agents wait for the bene¯ts of adjustment to become su±cient to o®set the costs. In
the context of the Fischer et al. (1989) model of capital structure, ¯rms wait to adjust
their leverage until the costs of debt recapitalization are o®set by the bene¯ts, either an
increased tax advantage or decreased expected bankruptcy cost depending on whether
the ¯rm decides to increase or decrease leverage. The size and frequency of the recapi-
talization depends, in large part, upon the structure of the adjustment cost function.
Figure 1 presents leverage ratios simulated under three di®erent adjustment cost sce-
narios: a ¯xed cost (Panel A), a proportional cost (Panel B), and a ¯xed cost plus a
weakly convex cost component (Panel C). The simulations are implemented assuming
that leverage follows a random walk in the no-recapitalization region, de¯ned by the
lower (L
¹
) and upper (¹ L) boundaries. Typically, the boundaries and initial leverage are
derived as the solution to a dynamic programming problem and are complex functions of
the underlying parameters of the model (see, for example, Fischer et al. (1989)). Since
our goal, at this point, is only to illustrate the intuition behind the impact of adjustment
costs on leverage, we choose boundaries that are one standard deviation from the initial
leverage value and implement the optimal recapitalization policy corresponding to each
cost scenario. The optimal policy under di®erent cost scenarios is discussed in a number
of earlier works spanning several ¯elds, including operations research (Harrison (1985)),
economics (Caplin (1985)) and ¯nance (Constantinides (1986)). While the optimality of
such policies depends upon the theoretical environment, the intuition of the recapitaliza-
tion policy and corresponding leverage dynamics are dictated primarily by the functional
form of the adjustment costs. Indeed, the random shocks driving each simulation in
Figure 1 are identical. Di®erences in the simulated paths are solely the result of di®erent
recapitalization policies induced by the di®erent cost structures.
Under a ¯xed cost regime, as in Fischer et al. (1989), the optimal control policy is to
make one large adjustment upon reaching a boundary, thereby returning leverage to its
initial level (L¤). The intuition for such a policy is that once the bene¯ts from adjustment
outweigh the cost, the ¯rm can make as large an adjustment as it desires because the
cost and size of the adjustment are independent of one another. The outcome of this
policy is illustrated in Panel A. Each time leverage touches a boundary (L
¹
or ¹ L), the
¯rm issues/repurchases debt so as to return leverage to its initial value (L¤). Points of
recapitalization are denoted by the circles on the dotted line.6 The resulting leverage
6More precisely, in the Fisher et al. (1989) model, ¯rms costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt
and issue a new amount that is either more or less than the previous amount, depending on whether
5behavior is best described as \lumpy", as ¯rms irregularly make one relatively large
adjustment. Thus, the de¯ning characteristics of a ¯xed cost and the corresponding
recapitalization policy is that leverage adjustments are large and occur infrequently.
Panel B presents the results of the optimal control policy under a proportional cost
function.7 The recapitalization policy in this scenario mandates that ¯rms make very
small, continuous changes upon reaching a recapitalization boundary. Cost minimizing
¯rms recognize that each additional dollar of adjustment incurs an additional cost, so
that the minimum adjustment to return leverage to the optimal range will take place.
Thus, leverage adjustments tend to be very small and highly clustered in time.
Panel C presents the results for a cost function consisting of both ¯xed and weakly
convex components. The optimal control policy in this case lies between that of the
strictly ¯xed cost and strictly proportional cost cases. When leverage reaches a boundary,
the size of the adjustment is such that leverage returns somewhere between the ¯xed cost
optimum and the closest boundary. For example, when leverage hits the upper boundary
¹ L ¯rms adjust so that leverage returns to ¹ L¤. The ¯xed cost induces ¯rms to make a
large enough adjustment so that the bene¯t of adjusting overcomes the ¯xed component
of the cost function. However, the convex cost penalizes each additional dollar. Thus, the
size and frequency of leverage adjustments fall somewhere in between the two extremes
illustrated in Panels A and B.
Guided by previous research, we use three di®erent proxies for the direct costs of
security issuance. First, we use the underwriter spread estimates from Altinkilic and
Hansen (2000) to proxy for the issuance costs of debt and equity. Altinkilic and Hansen
regress underwriter spreads on the size of the issuance and the size of the issuance relative
to the size of the ¯rm (i.e. market capitalization). We use their estimated parameters
to estimate underwriter spreads for our sample of ¯rms. We also use credit ratings as a
proxy for debt issuance costs, as suggested by Lee et al. (1996). In a similar spirit, we
use Altman's Z-Score (1968) as an additional proxy for debt issuance, though we note
that Z-Score (and credit ratings) may also capture expected costs of ¯nancial distress.8
the lower or upper boundary is struck. The adjustment cost is proportional to the par value of the new
debt issue. Since the size of the new issue always returns the ¯rm to the same leverage ratio, the cost
is e®ectively ¯xed. Fischer et al. also allow for the possibility of bankruptcy, in which case the lower
boundary becomes an absorbing barrier.
7In the Fischer et al. (1989) setting, the cost is proportional to the change in face value of debt. Con-
stantinides (1986) implements such a control policy under proportional costs in the context of portfolio
selection.
8We modify Altman's Z-Score to be de¯ned as the reciprocal of: assets divided by the sum of 3.3
6A recent study by Cook et al. (2003) shows that most equity repurchase programs ad-
here to the provisions of SEC Rule 10b-18, which provides a safe harbor for ¯rms against
charges of stock price manipulation based solely on the timing or price of repurchases.
The Rule imposes restrictions on the timing, price and amount of shares that ¯rms may
repurchase on any given day. Most relevant for our discussion is that nonblock purchases
for a day cannot exceed the greater of one round lot and the number of round lots closest
to 25% of the security's trading volume. In so far as this restriction is binding, it may
be viewed as imposing a signi¯cant variable cost since shares purchased in excess of the
prescribed limit are in violation of an SEC rule and thus subject to legal action. As such,
we use the maximum turnover during the period as a measure of the restrictiveness of
the volume provision. Greater turnover implies greater freedom in repurchasing shares
and thus lower costs.
Unfortunately, we have little help from past research regarding the cost of debt re-
tirement. This is not to say that early retirement of debt is free of any direct costs. In
the case of privately placed debt, early retirement can often incur penalties, renegotia-
tion costs, and other fees.9 Publicly placed debt retirement faces a di®erent di±culty in
the form of illiquid secondary markets (see, for example, the discussion in Chen et al.
(2003)). While we have no speci¯c proxies for the direct costs of retiring debt, our hope
at this point is that our analysis can lend some insight into the form of any costs ¯rms
may face in retiring debt. An explicit examination of this issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this study.
A.2. Dynamic Trade-o® Predictions
Returning to Figure 1, we note several important issues that are relevant for the empirical
analysis of capital structure. First, the persistence of shocks on the leverage process is
insu±cient to reject a dynamic trade-o® theory. Under each cost regime discussed above,
shocks to leverage do not induce a response as long as the leverage process remains in
the no-recapitalization region (i.e. between L
¹
and ¹ L). Further, the size of the response
need not completely o®set the shock, returning leverage to its pre-shock level. Second,
the structure of adjustment costs dictates the size and frequency of adjustments. As
adjustment costs transition from ¯xed (Panel A), to ¯xed plus convex (Panel C), to
times earnings before interest and taxes plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working
capital. A similar measure is employed in Mackie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996).
9We thank Steven Roberts of Toronto Dominion and Rob Ragsdale of First Union for their insight
on commercial lending.
7proportional (Panel B), we see the size of adjustment decrease and the frequency of
adjustment increase. Finally, examination of the temporal or cross-sectional variation in
the level of (or change in) leverage can be misleading when it comes to inferring ¯nancing
behavior. Two otherwise identical ¯rms, both following a dynamic trade-o® strategy, can
have very di®erent leverage ratios and leverage dynamics simply due to di®erent random
shocks to their capital structures. In order to understand the motives behind corporate
¯nancial policy, we focus on the determination of the adjustments themselves (i.e. why
¯rms adjust when they do?).
Using the dynamic trade-o® framework illustrated in Figure 1 as a motivation for
the empirical analysis results in three clear predictions concerning leverage adjustments.
The underlying theme of these predictions is that any force that moves the leverage pro-
cess closer to a particular recapitalization boundary, increases the likelihood of hitting
that boundary and therefore increases the probability of making a particular adjustment
(leverage increase or decrease). Thus, the higher the level of leverage, all else equal,
the more likely that leverage will hit the upper boundary and the ¯rm will decrease its
leverage. The lower the level of leverage, the more likely that leverage will hit the lower
boundary and the ¯rm will increase its leverage. Simply put, we expect a negative asso-
ciation between the level of leverage and the direction of adjustment (leverage increase
or decrease).
Similarly, an accumulation (decrease) in leverage should result in a greater likelihood
of decreasing (increasing) leverage. Thus, we also expect a negative association between
the change in leverage and the direction of adjustment.
Finally, past leverage adjustments will also a®ect the likelihood of adjustment. For
example, after reaching a lower boundary a ¯rm increases its leverage moving it closer
to the upper boundary. Thus, the likelihood of subsequently decreasing its leverage
goes up since it is now closer to the upper boundary, even though leverage may still
be relatively closer to the lower boundary, as in the case of proportional or, ¯xed plus
convex adjustment costs. So while leverage may still be more likely to hit the lower
boundary again before hitting the upper boundary, the key point is that the adjustment
moved leverage closer to the upper boundary making the process more likely to reach
that boundary than it was prior to the adjustment.
8B. The Costs and Bene¯ts of Debt
Though our focus is on the dynamic implications of the trade-o® theory, we must also
account for the perceived costs and bene¯ts of ¯nancial policy. The original static trade-
o® theory views the costs of debt as corresponding to bankruptcy costs, both direct (e.g.,
legal fees and administrative costs) and indirect (e.g., customer °ight and reputation
loss). We examine the volatility of cash °ows, measured by the absolute value of the
change in net income normalized by book assets, as a proxy for the likelihood of becoming
¯nancially distressed. We examine the ratio of selling expenses to total sales as a measure
of product uniqueness (see Titman and Wessels (1988) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003)).
Companies with ¯rm-speci¯c assets may experience greater ¯nancial distress costs due
to the greater di±culty associated with liquidating these assets in the market. Finally,
asset tangibility, measured by the fraction of total assets attributable to property, plant
and equipment (Rajan and Zingales (1995)), is used to proxy for bankruptcy recovery
rates. Those ¯rms with a greater fraction of tangible assets may have a higher recovery
rate in bankruptcy and correspondingly lower costs. This measure also proxies for the
¯rm's ability to collateralize debt. The bene¯ts of debt are associated with the tax shield
it provides. We use depreciation and amortization as a fraction of total assets (DeAngelo
and Masulis (1980) and Titman and Wessels (1988)) to measure non-debt tax shields
that o®set the tax bene¯ts of debt ¯nancing.
Agency-based models associate the costs of debt with asset substitution (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)) and underinvestment (Myers (1977)). Thus, ¯rms with large growth
or investment opportunities, as measured by capital expenditures relative to total assets
(Titman and Wessels (1988)) and the market-to-book ratio (which we de¯ne as total
assets minus book equity plus market equity, all divided by total assets), should be less
likely to use debt ¯nancing.10 The bene¯ts of debt in an agency cost framework come
from its ability to constrain managerial discretion and mitigate the free cash °ow problem
(Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Zwiebel (1996)). More pro¯table ¯rms, measured by
after tax operating income divided by total assets, are thus more likely to use debt
¯nancing.
For completeness, we incorporate several other variables that have been used in pre-
vious studies. Firm size is measured by ¯rm sales in period t divided by the total sales of
10We also note that the market-to-book ratio may capture the e®ect of stock prices on ¯rm's ¯nancing
decisions. Indeed, Baker and Wurgler (2002) use a weighted average of historical market-to-book ratios
as the basis for their market timing hypothesis. In an e®ort to better isolate the e®ect of stock price
movements on corporate decisions, we also examine the e®ect of the previous year's equity return.
9our sample during period t. The normalization is used to correct for the nonstationarity
of the sales variable. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that larger ¯rms may be more
diversi¯ed and, as such, less likely to enter ¯nancial distress. Thus, larger ¯rms are more
likely to use debt ¯nancing. To capture any macroeconomic e®ects (Korajczyk and Levy
(2003)) we incorporate year and quarter dummies into the analysis. Similarly, 2-digit
SIC code dummies are included to capture any industry-speci¯c variation in ¯nancing
choices (MacKay and Phillips (2003)). Finally, we include the level of cash as a fraction
of book assets to control for a ¯rm's ability to ¯nance investment with internal funds. In
sum, our control variables represent a fairly comprehensive set of those variables used in
previous studies.
II. Data, Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
The data are taken from the combined quarterly research, full coverage and industrial
COMPUSTAT ¯les for the years 1984 - 2001.11 We also extract return data from the
CRSP monthly stock price ¯le. All regulated (SICs 4900-4999) and ¯nancial ¯rms (SICs
6000-6999) are removed from the sample to avoid ¯nancial policy governed by regulatory
requirements and maintain consistency with earlier studies (e.g. Fama and French (2002),
Frank and Goyal (2003) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003)). Any observations with missing
data for the book value of assets, stock issuances, stock repurchases, short term debt or
long-term debt are deleted because these variables are required to determine whether
an issuance or repurchase has occurred. Finally, since the emphasis of this study is on
dynamic capital structure, we restrict our attention to ¯rms with at least four years of
contiguous observations.12 The ¯nal dataset is an unbalanced panel containing 127,308
¯rm-quarter observations: 3,494 ¯rms each with a time series of observations ranging in
length from 16 to 71 quarters.13
A. Capital Structure Adjustments
To de¯ne when a change in capital structure has occurred, we follow the approach used
by Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian (2003) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003). An
issuance or repurchase is de¯ned as having occurred in a given quarter if the net change in
11This start date was chosen since our key equity issuance and repurchase variables are not available
at a quarterly frequency prior to 1984.
12We relax and tighten this restriction to three and ¯ve years with no e®ect on our results.
13The maximal time series length is not 72 (18 £ 4) quarters because of the inclusion of lagged data.
10equity or debt, normalized by the book value of assets at the end of the previous period,
is greater than 5%. For example, a ¯rm is de¯ned as having issued debt in quarter t when
the change in the total value of debt from quarter t ¡ 1 to t, divided by the book value
of assets at the end of quarter t¡1, exceeds 5%. We de¯ne four basic types of ¯nancing
\spikes": equity issuances, equity repurchases, debt issuances, and debt retirements, each
of which is represented mathematically by a binary variable indicating whether or not
a spike has occurred for ¯rm i in period t. With the exception of equity repurchases,
all spike de¯nitions use the 5% cuto®. Equity repurchases use a 1.25% cuto® to avoid
missing the numerous smaller sized repurchase programs in place.14
While there may be instances of misclassi¯cation using this scheme, such as when
convertible debt is called or when an equity account is transferred from a subsidiary to
a parent, Hovakimian et al. (2001) show that analysis carried out using new debt and
equity issue data from SDC produces similar results to analysis using the 5% classi¯ca-
tion scheme. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) also con¯rm the accuracy of this classi¯cation
scheme. We present additional accuracy checks below and note that Whited (2003) uses
a similar approach to identify investment decisions. This classi¯cation also allows us to
capture changes in total debt due to private debt net issuing activity that may not be
tracked by the SDC database. As Houston and James (1996) and Bradley and Roberts
(2003) show, the majority of corporate debt is comprised of private placements. 15
In addition to the four basic types of ¯nancing spikes, we examine two additional
measures of capital structure adjustment that we refer to as leverage increasing decisions
and leverage decreasing decisions (or, more succinctly, as leverage increase and leverage
decrease). Since our focus is on corporate decisions that impact leverage, we require
measures that can isolate the e®ect of ¯nancial decisions on leverage, while ignoring
those ¯nancing decisions that have no impact. For example, a ¯rm that issues debt and
equity in proportions equal to the ¯rm's previous debt-equity ratio does not a®ect its
leverage, despite the fact that it has undertaken a large amount of net issuing activity.
To isolate those decisions that impact leverage, we de¯ne a leverage increase as net debt
issuance minus net equity issuance, divided by book assets, in excess of 5%, and a leverage
decrease as net equity issuance minus net debt issuance, divided by book assets, in excess
14We thank Roni Michaely and Ray Groth for bringing our attention to this issue.
15As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis using a 3% and 7% cuto® for debt issuances, debt
retirements and equity issuances with negligible e®ect on our results. We also vary the equity repurchase
cuto® from 0.5% to 3%, again with negligible e®ect on our results. As such, we present results based
only on the 5% (1.25% for equity repurchases) cuto®, in what follows.
11of 5%.16 As with the four ¯nancing spikes, the mathematical representation of each of
these leverage adjustments is a binary variable.
Table I presents summary statistics for each type of adjustment. Perhaps the most
striking result is that in 72% of the quarters in our sample no adjustment occurs. That is,
a majority of the time ¯rms are inactive with respect to their capital structure. However,
since we are employing quarterly data, a 72% inactivity rate implies that the average
¯rm adjusts their capital structure approximately once a year. Thus, ¯nancing activity
is actually quite frequent, but far from continuous. This inactivity is consistent with the
presence of adjustment costs, but could also be consistent with the alternative hypothesis
that ¯rms are indi®erent toward leverage, as market timing or inertia would predict. A
more thorough examination of these alternatives is postponed until the formal modelling
below.
The most common form of adjustment is debt issuances, which account for over 40%
of all capital structure adjustments.17 This is followed by debt retirements (28%), stock
issuances (17%) and stock repurchases (14%). On a per ¯rm basis, we see a similar
pattern. The average ¯rm has approximately 36 quarters worth of data and experiences
4.2 debt issuances, 2.8 debt retirements, 1.9 equity issuances, and 2.8 equity repurchases.
We also note that there are a signi¯cant number (2,219) of joint stock issuance and debt
retirement observations, which are captured by the leverage decrease measure but not
explicitly reported in the table.
Table I also presents summary information on ¯nancing spell durations, which is the
amount of time between ¯nancing spikes. Financing spells and their duration are analo-
gous to unemployment spells and the amount of time unemployed. The median duration
of each type of spell ranges from 3 quarters for debt issuances to 5 quarters for equity
issuances. However, we refrain from drawing any conclusions from these durations, as
they represent unconditional estimates from a heterogeneous sample containing censored
durations and are likely quite biased. Because the sample ends in 2001 and some ¯rms
drop out of the sample prior to 2001 (e.g., bankruptcy), there are a number of right-
censored spells. Right-censoring occurs when a spell is still ongoing at the end of a ¯rm's
data series. For example, a ¯rm that issues debt in the ¯rst quarter of 2000 and then
16As with the four basic adjustments, we also examine the e®ect of using a 3% and 7% cuto® on our
results. This change has little e®ect on our results.
17We note that these issuances are not rollovers of debt, except in the unlikely situation that there
is a delay between retirement and issuance that forces the recording of each event to occur in separate
quarters.
12does not issue debt again before the end of the sample period, has a right censored debt
issuance spell with a duration of seven quarters. For right-censored spells we can only
place a lower bound on the duration of the spell. The consequence of right censoring is a
downward bias in the unconditional duration estimates, which we address in the formal
modelling. Because the ¯rst spell is measured with respect to the ¯rst observed ¯nancing
spike, there is no left-censoring, as well as no IPOs.18
The bottom two rows of Table I present summary information concerning leverage
adjustments. Firms tend to increase their leverage more often than they decrease it
(12.9% compared to 11.9%). If a ¯rm, on average, experiences positive drift in its equity
value then leverage has a natural tendency to decline. To counteract this tendency,
the trade-o® theory implies that ¯rms will lever up more often than down. Thus, this
preliminary evidence suggests that ¯rms counteract the natural tendency of equity values
to rise over time.
Table II presents summary statistics on the magnitude of the di®erent types of adjust-
ments. All dollar values are in°ation adjusted to 2001 dollars using the All-Urban CPI.
We focus our discussion of these results on medians because of the large skew in each
measure's distribution. Debt issuances and retirements are comparable in magnitude,
with median sizes of $7.8 million and $6.6 million, respectively. Median equity issuances
are quite small ($3.6 million), while equity repurchases represent the largest adjustment
($11.2 million).
We make two comments concerning these amounts. First, though equity issuances
(repurchases) represents the smallest (largest) adjustment in terms of dollar magnitude,
they represents the largest (smallest) adjustment in terms of magnitude relative to total
assets. Thus, small ¯rms issue equity, while large ¯rms repurchase equity, a ¯nding
consistent with that of Frank and Goyal (2003) and Lemmon and Zender (2002). Second,
because of the large number of small ¯rms in our sample, the average and median issuance
and retirement ¯gures appear quite small. However, when we look at the subsample of
our ¯rms that meet the sample selection criteria of Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), the
average and median size of equity issuances, for example, are comparable.19 A similar
18We also perform all of our analysis on a subsample of ¯rms that have IPO dates in either Security
Data Corporations's (SDC) Global New Issue Database or Jay Ritter's IPO database (we thank Andrew
Roper for providing this data). The IPO date enables us to establish a time origin for each ¯rm, albeit
a public one, independent of the occurrence of the ¯rst spell. The results are unchanged from those
presented.
19More speci¯cally, when we restrict attention to equity issues between $10 and $1,000 million during
13comparison of debt issuances with Altinkilic and Hansen's sample is less enlightening since
our measures capture private debt issuances, which form the majority of debt ¯nancing.
Preliminary evidence of market timing can be seen by comparing the size of equity
issuances normalized by the book value of assets (0.20) versus those normalized by the
market value of equity (0.09). The other three adjustments show signi¯cantly smaller dif-
ferences in these two measures, suggesting that ¯rms tend to issue equity when the market
value of equity is relatively high. A ¯nal look at the median ratios of issue/repurchase size
to book assets suggests that most capital structure adjustments represent a signi¯cant,
yet relatively small fraction of ¯rm value.
III. Duration Analysis
A. The Hazard Function
We begin by brie°y outlining the intuition behind our statistical approach. The discussion
here is informal and given in the context of capital structure adjustment. For a more
thorough treatment of duration analysis, see Lancaster (1990) or Kalb°iesch and Prentice
(2002).
Let T be a random variable measuring the duration between capital structure adjust-
ments. The hazard function is de¯ned as
h(t) = limm!0
Pr(t · T < t + mjT ¸ t)
m
(1)
and speci¯es the instantaneous rate at which a ¯rm adjusts its capital structure condi-
tional on not having done so for time t. Less formally, h(t)m tells us the probability
that a ¯rm will adjust its capital structure in the next m units of time, conditional on
not having adjusted up to time t. For example, the hazard function for debt issuances
at t = 4 tells us the probability that a ¯rm will issue debt during the next quarter (m
= 1), conditional on not having done so during the last four quarters (t = 4). Thus, by
modelling the time between issuing/repurchasing activities, the hazard function provides
a description of the dynamic behavior of ¯nancing decisions made by the ¯rm.
the period 1990-1997 made by non¯nancial, nonregulated industrial ¯rms, our average equity issuance
size is $44 million compared to Altinkilic and Hansen's ¯gure of $59 million. However, our subsample of
¯rms has a mean market capitalization of $338 million compared to $429 million for the their sample.
Thus, the average ¯rm from our subsample is approximately 3=4ths the size of their average ¯rm.
Consequently, the average issuance size for our subsample is approximately 3=4ths the size of their
average issuance. A similar relation holds for median issuances as well.
14The hazard function can o®er insight into the structure of adjustment costs faced by
¯rms. Figure 2 presents three estimated hazard functions using the simulated leverage
data from panels A through C in Figure 1. More speci¯cally, we simulate 100 leverage
paths where each path consists of 100 time series observations. For each simulation, we
implement the optimal recapitalization policy as determined by the assumed cost function
(¯xed, proportional, and ¯xed plus convex). Using this data, we then estimate the hazard
curve for leverage increasing adjustments (i.e. adjustments in response to hitting the
lower barrier, L
¹
, in Figure 1). That is, we model the time between leverage increasing
adjustments. To clearly convey the e®ect of di®erent adjustment costs on the hazard
function, we parameterize h(t) as a cubic polynomial in t and estimate the parameters
using maximum likelihood assuming that durations are independent and exponentially
distributed.20
Panel A of Figure 2 reveals that under a ¯xed cost of adjustment, the hazard rate
is increasing in time, eventually levelling o® after 17 periods and then slightly turning
downward. However, given the fact that the number of observations with durations
greater than 17 periods is relatively small and decreasing with the duration, the estimates
of the far right tail of the hazard curve can be quite imprecise. Regardless, the key
characteristic of the hazard curve that we note is that it is upward sloping, suggesting
that the longer the ¯rm has gone without adjusting its leverage upward, the more likely it
is to do so. Returning to Panel A of Figure 1, it is easy to see this intuition. Immediately
after a ¯rm increases its leverage, returning it to L¤, the ¯rm is relatively unlikely to strike
the lower boundary very soon. As time progresses and the leverage process wanders, the
probability that it hits the lower boundary in the near future increases. Thus, large,
infrequent adjustments induced by a strictly ¯xed cost of adjustment result in an upward
sloping hazard curve. 21
Panel B of Figure 2 reveals that proportional adjustment costs induce a steeply down-
ward sloping hazard curve, suggesting that as time passes since the last adjustment, the
likelihood of making another adjustment declines rapidly. In light of Panel B in Figure
1, proportional adjustment costs lead to very small adjustments, so that the leverage
process is still very close to the lower boundary, L
¹
. This proximity suggests that the
likelihood of striking the same boundary again is very high. In order for leverage to
not strike the same boundary again soon after the initial contact, the process must drift
away from the boundary making it less likely to strike as time passes. Thus, very small
20Estimated hazard curves for leverage decreasing adjustmentes yield similar results.
21See Whited (2003) for a discussion of these issues in the context of investment decisions.
15adjustments induced by a strictly proportional cost results in a steeply downward sloping
hazard curve.
Finally, Panel C of Figure 2 shows that a ¯xed plus a weakly convex cost of adjust-
ment results in a more moderately downward sloping hazard curve, relative to a strictly
proportional cost. Again, the intuition is found by referring back to Panel C of Figure 1
and recognizing that the moderate adjustments made by ¯rms lead to a higher likelihood
of striking the same boundary soon after adjusting. But, the probability is signi¯cantly
less in comparison to that under proportional adjustment costs.
We also mention a few ¯nal notes on the relation between the hazard curve and
adjustment costs. The general level of the hazard curve re°ects the overall frequency of
adjustments: the higher the level the more frequently adjustments occur, suggesting lower
costs of adjustment, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the hazard curve, in and of itself, does
not enable us to identify or disentangle the di®erent adjustment costs facing the ¯rm.
It merely provides us with a description of the dynamic behavior of corporate ¯nancial
policy, which we then use to infer the adjustment cost structure ¯rms face, as Whited
(2003) does in the context of investment. While not a substitute for studies focusing
explicitly on the costs of adjusting (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)), the hazard curve
analysis is complimentary in the sense that it enables us to determine whether direct
costs are re°ected in the ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms.
However, more important than the insight on adjustment costs, the duration model
enables us to understand the motivation behind capital structure decisions by modelling
the time between those decisions. As such, there is a very close relationship between
duration models and discrete choice models. Therefore, it is not surprising that our results
are broadly consistent with those of Hovakimian et al. (2001) who employ discrete choice
models in their analysis of capital structure decisions, albeit with annual data. However,
there are a number of advantages of the duration approach taken in this paper that we
discuss below.
B. A Semiparametric Duration Model
Starting from the de¯nition in equation (1), we parameterize the hazard function of the
jth spell for ¯rm i as
hij(tj!i) = !ih0(t)expfxij(t)
0
¯g; (2)
where !i is a random variable representing unobserved heterogeneity, h0(t) is a step
function referred to as the baseline hazard, xij(t) is a vector of covariates and ¯ is an
16unknown parameter vector. As in Meyer (1990) and Whited (2003), we assume that the
unobserved heterogeneity has a Gamma distribution and perform the estimation using
maximum likelihood. A detailed derivation of the likelihood function is provided in the
Appendix.
Intuitively, !i is analogous to an error term in a regression and, similarly, represents
the cumulative e®ect of any omitted covariates. A key distinction between our speci-
¯cation, and Meyer's and Whited's is that we force the unobserved heterogeneity (!i)
to remain constant across spells for the same ¯rm in order to capture the dependence
of within-¯rm observations. Meyer's model was of single spell unemployment data and
hence each spell was assumed to be independent. The fact that !i is constant across
adjustments made by the same ¯rms generates a dependence between ¯nancing decisions
made by the same ¯rm. This assumption corresponds to the notion that durations be-
tween capital structure adjustments for the same ¯rm are likely to be correlated. For
example, a ¯rm facing low costs of adjustment is more likely to experience shorter dura-
tions between adjustments and vice versa for ¯rms facing high costs of adjustment.
The covariates (xij(t)) that we examine were outlined in section I and are guided both
by earlier empirical research and the hypotheses that we wish to test. To avoid using
information not yet known at the time of the adjustment decision, we lag all covariates
one quarter except for the ratio of capital expenditures to book assets. We use the
one period future value of this variable in order to capture anticipated ¯nancing needs,
assuming that ¯rms have a reasonably good idea of those needs over short horizons such
as one quarter.
Table III presents summary statistics for each of the variables, after performing several
modi¯cations to address outlier values. First, we trim the upper and lower 1-percentile
of each variable's distribution. Second, we restrict leverage to lie in the unit interval.
Finally, we restrict the market-to-book ratio (MA/BA) to lie between 0 and 10, as in
Baker and Wurgler (2002).22 All variables, with the exception of MA/BA and Z-Score are
measured in percentages. While most of the covariate characteristics are consistent with
previous studies using these measures, the average and median estimated underwriter
spreads are signi¯cantly in°ated relative to that estimated by Altinkilic and Hansen
(2000). This is, in large part, due to di®erences between their sample and ours. It also
suggests that extrapolating their results outside of their sample should be done with
caution. As such, we use estimates of the underwriter spread as a relative measure of
issuance costs, as opposed to a precise measure of the exact costs.
22Using a maximal value for market-to-book of 20 produces no substantive change in our results.
17At this point, it is worth discussing some of the advantages and limitations of this
model. First, the model is dynamic; we are able to incorporate the complete time path
of covariates into the model, rather than averaging covariates over time, as in a static
discrete-choice setting. Given that the average is not likely to be a su±cient statistic
for the temporal distribution of most variables, our method is more e±cient than static
discrete choice models and avoids any bias introduced by the data aggregation. An ad-
ditional advantage of the dynamic nature of the model is that we avoid the ine±ciency
associated with two-step estimation procedures used in Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hov-
akimian (2003) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003), and the introduction of estimation error
implicit in their estimates of target leverage. We are able to incorporate the determinants
of optimal leverage directly into the speci¯cation, thereby implicitly modelling any devi-
ation from an optimum, while estimating all parameters jointly in a maximum likelihood
framework.
Second, we explicitly model dynamic ¯nancing decisions, as opposed to the time series
variation in the level of leverage. As discussed earlier, leverage by itself can be a noisy
measure of ¯rms' ¯nancial policies. As Welch (2004) notes at an annual frequency and we
con¯rm at a quarterly frequency, a large fraction of the time variation in the level of lever-
age stems from movements in the market value of equity, as opposed to active ¯nancial
management. To determine the motives of ¯nancing decisions, we model the decision-
making process, asking \why do ¯rms adjust their leverage when they do?" Thus, we
avoid potentially spurious correlations between the level of (or change in) leverage and
its determinants that can result from most ¯rm-quarter observations corresponding to
periods of inactivity.
Third, the model retains the spirit of a nonparametric approach by specifying the
baseline hazard, h0(t), as a step function. This ensures that our estimated hazard curves
are not artifacts of an assumed functional form. The speci¯cation also addresses our
two primary statistical concerns. Cross-sectional and longitudinal heterogeneity is cap-
tured both by observable variables (xij(t)) and unobservable ¯rm characteristics (!i).
Dependence among decisions made by the same ¯rm is captured by assuming that the
unobserved heterogeneity (!i) is constant across spells for the same ¯rm.
Finally, we make several comments concerning interpretation of the estimated hazard
function. The baseline hazard is a measure of the hazard function when all covariates are
zero. Therefore all covariates are transformed by subtracting the median value across all
¯rms for each quarter. This transformation enables the baseline hazard to be interpreted
as the hazard rate for the median ¯rm in our sample. We choose to center all continuous
18covariates around their medians, as opposed to their means, because of the skewness in
many of the covariate distributions (see Table III).23 The speci¯cation is analogous to
Cox's (1972, 1975) proportional hazard in that variation in the covariates or unobserved
heterogeneity result in proportional shifts of the baseline hazard. So, a change in a
covariate instantly shifts the hazard curve up or down, depending on the sign of the
estimated coe±cient. However, this speci¯cation restricts the covariates from having
any e®ect on the slope or curvature of the hazard curve. This restriction aids in the
tractability of the model and simpli¯es the interpretation of estimated coe±cients. In
sum, the model is similar in spirit to a nonlinear dynamic panel regression with ¯rm-
speci¯c random e®ects. It enables us to address the statistical concerns, while accurately
testing the hypotheses laid out in section I.
IV. Estimation Results
For presentation purposes, we discuss our estimates of equation (2) in two parts. The ¯rst
part corresponds to the implications of the estimated baseline hazard and adjustment cost
proxy coe±cients for capital structure adjustment costs. The second part corresponds
to the implications of the other estimated covariate parameters for theories of capital
structure.24 Though presented separately, all parameters are estimated simultaneously
using maximum likelihood.
A. Baseline Hazards and Adjustment Costs
Estimates of the baseline hazard (h0(t) in equation (2)) are presented in Figure 3. Each
panel contains two estimates of the baseline hazard function: the jagged curve corre-
sponds to the step function estimate and the smooth one to a cubic polynomial esti-
mate.25 Also presented in each panel are the parameter estimates and t-stats of the
estimated cubic polynomial. Each point on the curve(s) may be loosely interpreted as
the probability of an adjustment in that period, conditional on no prior adjustment.
23In unreported analysis, we center the covariates around their means and ¯nd little di®erence in the
estimation results.
24There is an ancillary parameter of the model associated with the scale of the unobserved heterogene-
ity distribution, µ. This parameter is statistically signi¯cant in all of the estimated models suggesting
that unobserved heterogeneity is present, beyond that captured by the hazard curve and covariates. This
¯nding further reinforces the importance of accounting for such heterogeneity.
25Higher order polynomials were examined but resulted in insigni¯cant coe±cients and lower Akaike
and Schwartz information criteria.
19To mitigate the problem of a declining sample size as t increases, we de¯ne the width
of each step in the baseline hazard function as corresponding to one decile of the duration
distribution. The bene¯t of this approach is that each section of the hazard function has
approximately the same number of observations, which permits more reliable statistical
inference at longer durations. It also reduces the number of estimated parameters, leading
to a more parsimonious model and increased statistical power. The cost of this approach
is a decrease in the resolution of the hazard curve, particularly for larger t where more
durations are grouped together. To ensure that our estimated hazard curves are not
an artifact of this grouping, we reestimate all of the models assuming a step function
where each step width is one quarter. The general features (slope and curvature) of these
hazard curves are very similar to those in Figure 3 and, as such, the one-quarter width
results are not presented.
A.1. Issuance Costs
Using Figure 2 as a reference point, we now examine the estimated hazard curves in order
to determine if observed issuance decisions are consistent with the behavior implied by
the cost functions estimated by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). Altinkilic and Hansen
document several empirical facts regarding issuance costs, as measured by underwriter
spreads. First, equity issuance costs are, on average, 5.38% of the issue proceeds , while
debt issuance costs average only 1.09%. This ¯nding implies that equity issuances will
occur less frequently than debt issuances, assuming ¯rms minimize costs. Second, equity
and debt issuance costs contain both a ¯xed cost and convex cost component. This
¯nding implies that the estimated hazard curves should resemble Panel C of Figure 2.
Finally, for similar ¯rms, in terms of size and risk, equity issuance costs exhibit relatively
higher ¯xed costs and greater convexity than debt issuances. The greater ¯xed cost
implies that equity issuances will be relatively larger and less frequent, leading to lower
and °atter hazard curves. However, the impact of greater convexity on the hazard curve
is ambiguous.26
Turning to Figure 3, Panels A and B, we see that the general level of debt issuances is
26On the one hand, increasing the convexity of the cost curve increases the slope of the cost curve,
which, all else equal, would lead to smaller issuances as each dollar issued is penalized more heavily.
Simultaneously, the increased convexity results in a cost curve that lies strictly above the existing curve,
which has an e®ect similar to increasing the ¯xed cost component. That is, issuances will be larger,
all else equal. The net e®ect is thus ambiguous, requiring a structural model to determine which e®ect
dominates.
20noticeably higher than that for equity issuances, re°ecting the greater frequency of debt
issuances. The debt issuance hazard curve begins at approximately 0.13 and °attens out
after approximately ¯ve years at just over 0.04. The equity issuance hazard, however,
is below 0.04 for all durations. This result is consistent with signi¯cantly larger equity
issuance costs, as found by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000).
We also see that both hazard curves are downward sloping for all durations. This
fact is quanti¯ed by the slope coe±cients of the cubic approximation presented in the
inset boxes. Referring back to Figure 2, this result suggests that the cost structure is
best approximated by either a proportional cost, or a ¯xed and weakly convex issuance
cost. Because proportional costs imply minimal issuance sizes (see Panel B of Figure 1),
when, in fact, relative issuance sizes are non-trivial (see Table II), we suspect that the
estimated issuance hazard curves best re°ect ¯nancing behavior in the presence of both
a ¯xed and convex cost. This result is also consistent with the ¯ndings of Altinkilic and
Hansen.
Turning to Panel B of Table IV, we now examine the estimated coe±cients on the
underwriter spreads in the debt and equity issuance models. Underwriter spreads enter
the model by assuming that the relevant spread in any period is the actual spread for
the next issuance. That is, we assume that the spread preceding any issuance is just
the spread that is ultimately realized.27 The debt issuance spread shows a signi¯cantly
negative association, consistent with adjustment costs inhibiting debt issuances. Though
not presented, credit ratings (measured by an indicator variable for investment grade
debt) revealed a negative association with debt issuance, although the sample size is
dramatically reduced due to missing data.
Equity issuance costs, though relatively larger than debt issuance costs according to
the direct evidence (see, for example, Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)), show a positive
association with the likelihood of issuance. This perverse result could be due to the
extrapolation of Altinkilic and Hansen's equity underwriter spread estimates outside of
their sample, which consists of signi¯cantly larger ¯rms. Perhaps the underwriter spread
for the smaller ¯rms in our sample is determined by a di®erent process than that found by
Altinkilic and Hansen. Alternatively, the estimated spread may be capturing the e®ect
of some other, omitted variable in the equity issuance speci¯cation.
With the exception of the equity issuance cost proxy, our results concerning issuance
27This de¯nition creates the problem that censored durations do not have a spread since there is no
issuance. Thus, we use the preceding realized spread or the ¯rm-speci¯c average spread for any censored
observations. Our results are similar under both assumptions, so we present results for the former.
21decisions appear generally consistent with the implications of the direct evidence on
issuance costs. Costs are relatively larger for equity than debt, and both decisions behave
as though facing a cost function consisting of both a ¯xed cost and convex cost of issuance.
A.2. Retirement Costs
Panel C of Figure 3 shows that equity repurchases have a steeply downward sloping hazard
curve, similar to that in Panel B of Figure 2. This result suggests that equity repurchases
are highly clustered in time, particularly relative to other capital structure adjustments.
In light of the provisions of Rule 10b-18, this result is not surprising. Firms spread
their equity repurchase decisions over the duration of the repurchase program in order
to remain in accord with the Rule's provisions.28 Examination of the estimated turnover
coe±cient in Panel B of Table IV shows evidence consistent with the adjustment cost
interpretation, although statistically weak. Speci¯cally, those ¯rms experiencing greater
share turnover during the quarter can more easily repurchase a larger fraction of their
shares. As a result, these ¯rms are more likely to engage in share repurchases.
The interpretation of the debt retirement hazard is confounded by the natural life
cycle of debt securities. That is, the debt retirement decisions of ¯rms may just be a
consequence of the maturity structure of their debt. However, given that debt instruments
are often retired prior to maturity, there may be relevant costs. For example, illiquidity
in secondary bond markets makes repurchasing debt costly, particularly large amounts
of debt. Retiring or re¯nancing commercial loans prior to maturity can also be costly
because of penalties and/or bank fees. The estimated debt retirement hazard curve
in Panel D shows that retirement decisions occur fairly frequently (the high level of the
curve) and are clustered in time, but not to the extent of equity repurchases, for example.
This dynamic behavior suggests a cost structure similar to that of equity issuances, but at
a lower overall cost as indicated by the relative frequency of the two actions. Ultimately,
whether this behavior is a consequence of the associated direct costs is left to future
research. We now turn to tests of the trade-o® theory.
28While Cook et al. (2003) ¯nd that ¯rms do violate the repurchase provisions on occasion, they
conclude that \...¯rms are generally in compliance with the safe harbor guidelines for all repurchasing
activity." (P. 291)
22B. The Trade-O® Theory
The estimates of the covariate coe±cients (¯) are reported in Table IV. Panel A presents
the estimates for the two leverage adjustment spells (leverage increase and leverage de-
crease) and Panel B presents the estimates for the four basic ¯nancing spells (debt is-
suance, equity issuance, debt retirement, and equity repurchase) For presentation pur-
poses, estimated ¯xed e®ects coe±cients (industry, year and quarter) are not shown.
Interpretation of the coe±cients is aided by the column labelled Hazard Impact (HI).
This column transforms the parameters in the following manner:
Hazard Impact = (expf¯g ¡ 1) £ 100; (3)
The Hazard Impact gives the percentage change in the expected hazard rate for a one unit
increase in the corresponding variable. For example, increasing Leverage by 1% (1 unit)
decreases the debt issuance hazard by 0.80% ((expf¡0:0081g ¡ 1) £ 100), implying that
the likelihood of a debt issuance, conditional on not having issued debt up to that point
in time, decreases by 0.80%. For a binary variable, such as whether or not a leverage
decrease (LeverDown) has occurred during a debt issuance spell, the hazard impact gives
the percentage change in the hazard curve resulting from a change in state (from 0 to
1). So the hazard impact for LeverDown in the debt issuance model (44.41%) implies
that after a ¯rm decreases its leverage during a spell of debt issuance inactivity, the debt
issuance hazard increases by 44.41%. That is, conditional on not having issued debt for
some time, ¯rms are approximately 44% more likely to issue debt after decreasing their
leverage.
The evidence in support of the trade-o® theory is quite strong; almost all of the
empirical predictions are veri¯ed by our estimation results. We begin by examining the
impact of market leverage on capital structure adjustments. Focusing on the leverage
increase and decrease models in panel A of Table IV, we see that the level of and change in
market leverage have a negative (positive) e®ect on the probability of making a leverage
increasing (decreasing) change, even after controlling for other determinants. Firms with
high leverage (relative to that implied by the included determinants), or with leverage
that has been accumulating, are less likely to increase their leverage and more likely
to decrease their leverage. These e®ects are both highly statistically and economically
signi¯cant. A 1% increase in the level of leverage shifts down the leverage increase hazard
curve by 0.76% and shifts up the leverage decrease hazard curve by 1.60%. Similarly,
a 1% increase in the change in leverage shifts down the leverage increase hazard curve
by 0.57% and shifts up the leverage increase hazard curve by the same amount. Thus,
23¯nancing decisions are sensitive to both the level of and change in leverage. And, since
both of these measures are constructed with market equity, ¯nancing decisions are also
sensitive to any shocks to market equity that resonate through these measures.
Turning to panel B of Table IV, we see that debt policy is sensitive to the level of
and change in leverage in a manner consistent with the trade-o® theory. The estimated
hazard impacts for the level of leverage in the debt issuance and retirement models are
-0.80% and 1.83%, suggesting that ¯rms are less likely to issue debt and even more likely
to retire debt when their leverage is relatively high. Similarly, the change in leverage has a
statistically signi¯cant impact on debt issuance and retirement decisions (hazard impacts
of -0.44% and 0.63%, respectively). Equity repurchases are negatively related to the level
of and change in leverage, as they should be if the trade-o® theory is correct, although
the coe±cient on the change in leverage is statistically insigni¯cant. These results are
consistent with recent survey evidence on payout policy by Brav et al. (2003), who ¯nd
that a number of ¯rms say that they use equity repurchases to move their leverage ratio
closer to a target, and that high debt ¯rms are more likely to use equity repurchases
to manage credit ratings (and implicitly leverage ratios) than low debt ¯rms. Equity
issuances, on the other hand, show no signi¯cant association with the level of or change
in leverage. Thus, while ¯rms rebalance their capital structure in response to the level
of and change in leverage, they do so only through debt policy and equity repurchases.
Financing decisions are also sensitive to past ¯nancing decisions. Returning to the
leverage increase model in panel A of Table IV, the binary variable LeverDown is one
after a leverage decreasing adjustment occurs during a leverage increase spell and zero
otherwise. The positive coe±cient implies that when ¯rms decrease their leverage, they
are subsequently more likely to increase their leverage than they were before the decrease.
The hazard impact suggests that they are 47% more likely to increase their leverage
following the decrease. Analogously, when we examine the coe±cient on LeverUp in
the leverage decrease model, we see that ¯rms are 65% more likely to decrease their
leverage following leverage increasing actions. This sensitivity of leverage adjustments
to previous ¯nancing decisions is precisely what Fischer et al.'s (1989) dynamic trade-o®
model predicts. After each adjustment, leverage is closer to, and thus more likely to
strike, the opposite boundary than it was prior to the adjustment.
The debt and equity policy models in panel B reveal results that have similar im-
plications to those of the level of and change in leverage. Firms rebalance their capital
structures in response to past leverage increases and decreases using debt policy. The
hazard impact for LeverDown in the debt issuance model implies that ¯rms are 44%
24more likely to issue debt after having decreased their leverage. Analogously, ¯rms are
72% more likely to retire debt after having increased their leverage. The e®ect of Lever-
Down on equity repurchases is directionally inconsistent, but statistically insigni¯cant,
with the prediction of the trade-o® theory. Finally, past leverage increases have a signif-
icant positive e®ect on the likelihood of an equity issuance, consistent with the trade-o®
theory. Despite this consistency, we refrain from arguing that equity issuances are used as
a tool for capital structure rebalancing because of the importance of other determinants
in the equity issuance model, which we discuss below. So, while ¯rms respond to past
leverage adjustments, they do so primarily through debt policy.
In sum, ¯rms appear to choose their ¯nancial policy in a manner that is consistent
with the dynamic rebalancing implied by the trade-o® theory. The level of leverage,
change in leverage, and past ¯nancing decisions are all important determinants in future
¯nancing decisions; and their impact on those decisions coincides with a rebalancing
e®ort by ¯rms. Coupled with the evidence on adjustment costs, ¯rms appear to behave
as if attempting to maintain leverage within a desired range, as predicted by Fischer et
al. (1989). Closer inspection reveals that ¯rms actively rebalance their capital structure
by issuing and retiring debt and, to a lesser extent, by repurchasing equity. Equity
issuances, on the other hand, appear to be primarily driven by factors not associated
with rebalancing e®orts.
V. Alternative Theories of Capital Structure
The results presented above show that when ¯rms make adjustments to their capital
structure they do so, in large part, with rebalancing motives in mind. That said, we
now turn to reconciling these ¯ndings with recent empirical works arguing both against
dynamic rebalancing (Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004)) and for pecking order
behavior (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender (2001)).
A. Market Timing
The fact that ¯rms time markets in their security issuance decisions is well documented.29
Our results in Panel B of Table IV con¯rm these earlier ¯ndings with the coe±cient
29Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Korajczyk et al. (1991), Jung et al.
(1996), and Hovakimian et al. (2001) show a positive association between seasoned equity o®erings and
market valuations. Loughran et al. (1994) and Pagano et al. (1998) show a positive association between
initial public o®erings and market valuations. Ikenberry et al. (1995) show a negative association
between equity repurchases and market valuations.
25estimates on the cumulative 4-quarter stock return (Equity Return) and the market-to-
book ratio (MA/BA). The hazard impact for the cumulative stock return in the equity
issuance and repurchase models are 0.52% and -0.14%, respectively, both statistically
signi¯cant. Market-to-book (MA/BA) has an even stronger positive association with the
likelihood of an equity issuance (hazard impact of 21%), but a statistically insigni¯cant
association with the likelihood of an equity repurchase. However, the contention of
Baker and Wurgler is that equity market timing has an important and lasting impact
on corporate capital structure. Speci¯cally, they argue that ¯rms fail to rebalance their
leverage after issuing equity in an attempt to time the market. Consequently, capital
structure is solely the cumulative result of attempts to time equity markets and ¯rms are
no more or less likely to adjust their leverage in response to these timed equity issuances.
To test their hypothesis, Baker and Wurgler run several static cross-sectional regres-
sions in IPO-time, regressing leverage on a number of empirical proxies for determinants
of capital structure (e.g., pro¯tability, size, etc.) and their \external ¯nance weighted-
average market-to-book ratio" (EFWA). This ratio is de¯ned as:
t¡1 X
s=0
Net Equity Issueds + Net Debt Issueds Pt¡1
r=0 Net Equity Issuedr + Net Debt Issuedr
¢
µ
Market Value of Assetss
Book Value of Assetss
¶
; (4)
and is intended to capture historical equity market timing e®orts. The statistical (and
economic) signi¯cance of this variable over various horizons is interpreted as evidence that
the e®ect of historical valuations is large and distinct from other determinants of capital
structure. Baker and Wurgler continue by arguing that the e®ect is also persistent,
showing that historical market-to-book variation remains a strong determinant of the
cross-sectional variation in leverage ratios even after 10 years have passed. Thus, they
conclude that ¯rms do not rebalance their capital structure, as a dynamic trade-o® theory
would predict.
When one allows for dynamic optimization in the presence of adjustment costs, the
implication of Baker and Wurgler's empirical ¯nding is no longer clear. The negative
association between EFWA and leverage implies that large values of EFWA (due both to
large market-to-book ratios and corresponding equity issuances) are associated with low
values of leverage. In other words, ¯rms that have experienced relatively high historical
values for market-to-book while simultaneously issuing equity tend to have relatively low
values for current leverage. This ¯nding, and its persistence over time, would seem to
suggest that ¯rms do not rebalance away shocks to leverage emanating from changes in
the market-to-book ratio and equity issuances. Yet, as previously discussed, the persis-
tence of shocks to leverage is not inconsistent with trade-o® behavior in the presence of
26adjustment costs. The fact that ¯rms are not responding immediately or fully to an eq-
uity shock/issuance may be due to subsequent leverage realizations lying in between the
recapitalization boundaries. In addition to the evidence presented in the previous sec-
tion, we perform several tests designed to further distinguish dynamic trade-o® behavior
from market timing.
A.1. Equity Issuers vs. Non-Issuers
We begin by explicitly looking at the leverage response of equity-issuing ¯rms relative
to non-equity issuing ¯rms using the annual COMPUSTAT sample of Baker and Wur-
gler (2002).30 Each year, the entire sample is strati¯ed into four portfolios based on the
median asset size of the ¯rm (big and small) and the median market-to-book ratio of
the ¯rm (high and low). Within each of these portfolios, the sample is split between
those ¯rms that issued equity and those that did not, using the criteria described ear-
lier. Holding the ¯rms in these portfolios constant, we then track the average di®erence
between the leverage of the issuers and non-issuers over the next ¯ve years. To clarify,
in 1990, for example, we form four size/market-to-book portfolios, based on 1989 end-of-
year characteristics, and compute the average di®erence in leverage between those ¯rms
that issued equity in 1990 and those that did not within each of the four portfolios. We
follow these same portfolios of ¯rms over the next ¯ve years, recomputing the di®erence
in the leverage at each point in time. We also present the di®erence in leverage for these
¯rms in the year prior to the issuance. We repeat this exercise for all other years in the
sample (1975 to 1995) and then average across event times (i.e. start of the issue period,
end of the issue period, one year after the issue period, etc.). The goal of this exercise
is to determine if equity issuers in each of the four portfolios respond to the issuance by
subsequently increasing their leverage relative to the non-issuers, which act as a control
group.31
Panel A of Figure 4 presents the results. To clarify, small size, high market-to-book
¯rms that issue equity have a leverage in the year preceding the issuance (indicated by
30We veri¯ed the similarity of our sample to Baker and Wurgler's by closely reproducing most of their
major ¯ndings. We also note that all of the following analyses are also conducted using our sample of
quarterly COMPUSTAT data and result in similar conclusions.
31We perform this analysis in two ways. First, we control for survivors so that the portfolios are
unchanged for the entire period of observation (i.e. before the issuance through the following six years).
These results are presented in ¯gures 4 through 6. Second, we allow ¯rms to drop out of the sample
(e.g. due to bankruptcy). The results are una®ected.
27\Pre") that is, on average, 1.25% higher than similar ¯rms that do not issue equity. After
the issuance (period \0"), the average leverage of the issuers is 3.60% lower than that of
the non-issuers, re°ecting the impact of the equity issuance. Immediately clear from the
¯gure is that in the years following the equity issuance, the leverage of the equity issuers
in each portfolio gradually increases relative to the non-issuers. Within two years of the
issuance, big, high market-to-book ¯rms have increased their leverage to above that of
their non-issuing counterparts. Within four years, all four groups of equity issuers have
rebalanced away any e®ects of the issuance, relative to their control group of non-issuers.
Panel B shows that this increase in leverage among equity issuers is due to debt issuance
activity. Panel B compares the fraction of equity-issuers, relative to non-issuers, that
subsequently issue debt in each year after the equity issuance. The interpretation is
that those ¯rms that issue equity are subsequently more likely to issue debt, relative
to similar non-issuing counterparts, in the years following the equity issuance. This is
precisely what a dynamic trade-o® hypothesis predicts, and what was illustrated by the
duration model estimates presented in Table IV.
Figure 5 illustrates the Baker and Wurgler (2002) result, using a similar analysis to
that presented in Figure 4. Each year four portfolios of ¯rms are constructed based on
size and market-to-book and the di®erence in leverage between ¯rms with a high and
low EFWA (above and below the median value for the year) is computed. These same
portfolios are followed for ¯ve years and the average di®erence in leverage between these
two groups is computed in each of those years. This exercise is repeated for all years
in the sample and the leverage di®erences for each portfolio are averaged across event
time. Panel A presents the results and shows that ¯rms with a high EFWA tend to have
relatively low leverage for an extended period.
The contrast in results between Panel A in Figures 4 and 5 suggest that EFWA
may be capturing more than simply the impact of equity issuances. Using an approach
inspired by the recent study of Kayhan and Titman (2003), Panels B, C and D replicate
the analysis of Panel A, only comparing the leverage of groups distinguished by their
past equally-weighted average market-to-book (high versus low), the number of times
per year they have issued equity in the past (many versus few), and the size of past
equity issuances (large versus small). As before, we use medians to distinguish between
each group. Panel B shows that, in general, ¯rms with a high historical average market-
to-book tend to have persistently low leverage. However, when we compare the leverage
of those ¯rms that have done a lot of equity issuing with those that have not (Panel
C), we see a negligible leverage di®erence that is eventually erased for all but one of the
28portfolios. Similarly, comparing ¯rms that issue large and small amounts of equity reveals
that di®erences in leverage are negligible and erased fairly quickly, except for small low
market-to-book ¯rms. Thus, the Baker and Wurgler result is not one of unresponsiveness
to equity issuances (clear from Figure 4), but rather a natural tendency for ¯rms with
high average market-to-book to maintain low levels of leverage. And, as Kayhan and
Titman note, high historical average market-to-book ratios likely indicate higher long-
run growth opportunities, so that low leverage for these ¯rms is, in fact, consistent with
a trade-o® theory.
A.2. Adjustment Costs and Market Timing
We next examine the impact that adjustment costs have on the empirical results of Baker
and Wurgler (2002). Our dynamic trade-o® model allows for persistence in the leverage
process but suggests that this persistence may be mitigated for ¯rms with low costs of
adjustment. That is, ¯rms with a relatively low cost of adjustment will be more likely
to respond to shocks, all else equal, than ¯rms with high costs of adjustment. Visually,
low adjustment cost ¯rms have recapitalization boundaries (L
¹
and ¹ L in Figure 1) that
are relatively close together.
We can translate this prediction into the empirical framework of Baker and Wurgler
by examining the impact of adjustment costs on the EFWA coe±cient. For ¯rms with
very high (low) adjustment costs associated with debt issuances, we would expect the
persistence in leverage to be high (low) and, consequently, the magnitude of this coef-
¯cient to be large (small). In e®ect, the coe±cient on EFWA should attenuate with
decreasing debt issuance costs because ¯rms can more easily respond to any decrease in
leverage induced by large values of EFWA.
Panel A of Table V presents our replication of Baker and Wurgler's estimated EFWA
coe±cient (their \All Firms" row of Panel A in Table 3). While not identical, the results
are close enough to ensure that we have very closely approximated their sample selection
and methodology. We then split their sample into portfolios based on each of our three
di®erent debt issuance adjustment cost proxies: estimated underwriter spread, Altman's
Z-Score, and debt credit rating. For the ¯rst two proxies, the portfolios are formed based
on the lower, middle, and upper third of the proxy distribution. For the credit rating
proxy, we form two portfolios based on an above or below investment-grade credit rating.
The same regression from Panel A is then run separately on each portfolio. The results
are presented in Panel B of Table V.
29Uniformly across adjustment cost portfolios, the coe±cient on EFWA attenuates as
the cost of issuing debt decreases. This result holds for all three proxies, with the excep-
tion of a negligible di®erence between the medium and high cost groups for the Z-score
proxy. We then conduct paired t-tests, for each cost proxy, of the hypothesis that the
coe±cients in the high and low cost portfolios are the same, against the alternative hy-
pothesis that the coe±cient in the low cost portfolio is lower. For estimated spreads and
credit ratings, the di®erences are highly statistically signi¯cant with t-stats of -6.62 and
-2.16. For Z-score, the di®erence is still statistically signi¯cant (t-stat of -1.84), though
slightly less so than the other comparisons. These results show that for ¯rms for which
adjustment is relatively inexpensive, leverage is less persistent in the context of Baker
and Wurgler's model, a result counter to the implications of market timing but consistent
with the dynamic trade-o® model.
A.3. The Impact of Stock Issuances and EFWA on Rebalancing Decisions
Our next set of tests examines the impact of stock issuances and the EFWA variable in
the context of our duration model. According to the trade-o® theory, stock issuances
should increase the likelihood of a leverage increasing adjustments, as they correspond to
leverage moving closer to the lower recapitalization boundary. EFWA, however, would
only have an indirect e®ect in so far is it is correlated with leverage and past equity
issuances. Therefore, we would not expect EFWA to have much incremental explanatory
power beyond those variables already included in the model. Thus, after incorporating
each of these variables into our debt issuance and leverage increase models, the trade-o®
theory makes two predictions. First, and most important, the rebalancing results found
earlier are una®ected by the inclusion of these variables. Second, if stock issuances or
EFWA have any association with ¯nancing decisions, it is consistent with a rebalancing
e®ort by ¯rms.
We implicitly examined the response of ¯rms to stock issuances in Table IV, since the
LeverDown variable encompasses stock issuances. In order to focus exclusively on stock
issuances, we create a binary variable indicating whether a stock issuance has occurred
during the relevant spell (debt issuance or leverage increase). Columns 1 and 3 of Table
VI replace the LeverDown variable with this stock issuance variable. In both the debt
issuance and leverage increase models, the coe±cients are positive, consistent with the
trade-o® theory, but marginally signi¯cant with t-stats of 1.80 and 1.59, respectively. This
is not surprising since stock issuances represent a small fraction of the leverage decreasing
adjustments, so that the StockIss variable is less signi¯cant that the LeverDown variable.
30More importantly, the level of and change in leverage are una®ected by the inclusion of
this variable so that the rebalancing results from Table IV remain intact. When we
include the EFWA variable, it has no association with either debt issuance or leverage
increasing decisions (columns 2 and 4 of Table VI). Further, the rebalancing results are
all una®ected by the inclusion of EFWA.
As a ¯nal note, we recognize the multicollinearity between the level of leverage,
EFWA, the market-to-book ratio and stock issuances. Any attempts to treat this collinear-
ity by removing one or more variables only served to further reinforce the rebalancing
results.
A.4. The Duration of Responses to Stock Issuances
Our last examination of the market timing hypothesis consists of estimating how long it
takes for ¯rms to adjust their capital structure in response to stock issuances. Above,
we noted that the e®ect of an equity issuance on leverage is largely erased within two
years. We now compute a more formal estimate of this response time using our duration
framework.
Ideally, we would like to estimate the expected time from a stock issuance until the
next leverage-increasing adjustment occurs, using our results from the model presented
in Table VI. Unfortunately, this is an exceedingly complex task because of the dynamic
nature of our model.32 Instead, we compute this estimate using a slightly less complex
model that is similar in spirit to that presented in equation (2). We estimate the following
model:
h(t) = !ih0(t)expf®g; (5)
where duration now measures the time between a stock issuance and a leverage increasing
adjustment. As before, !i is an unobserved heterogeneity term with a Gamma distribu-
tion, and h0(t) is the unspeci¯ed baseline hazard. The key distinction between equations
(2) and (5) is that the latter has no time-varying covariates, xij(t), and as such is a
static model. Maximum likelihood estimation reveals that the median (average) time
that it takes a ¯rm to increase its leverage in response to a stock issuance is 4.4 (8.6)
quarters. Note the consistency of this estimate with the results in Panel A of Figure
4. Thus, while ¯rms do not respond immediately to stock issuances, possibly because of
adjustment costs, they do respond within a reasonably short time frame.
32Computation of the expected duration in our model (equation (2)) requires integration of the full
hazard, h(t), and then integration of the resulting duration density, f(t) = h(t)expf¡
R
h(s)g.
31B. Inertia
The inertia theory (Welch (2004)) argues that ¯rms fail to rebalance their capital struc-
ture in response to shocks to the market value of their equity, similar to the implication
of market timing, despite fairly active net issuing activity. Thus, Welch concludes that
variation in equity prices are the primary determinant of capital structure and \corporate
motives for capital structure relevant activities remain largely a mystery" (p. 20). To
test this theory, Welch uses OLS and the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method to estimate the
following model of leverage dynamics:
Dt+k
Dt+k + Et+k
= ®0 + ®1 ¢
Dt
Dt + Et
+ ®2 ¢
Dt
Dt + Et ¢ (1 + rt;t+k)
+ "t; (6)
where Dt is the book value of corporate debt, Et is the market value of equity, and rt;t+k
is the percent price change in the market value of equity between t and t + k. The
inertia hypothesis predicts that ®1 = 0 and ®2 = 1, implying that any change in leverage
between t and t + k is due to changes in the market value of equity over that period,
as opposed to adjustment to the start-of-period leverage ratio. Welch ¯nds that, over
various time horizons, ^ ®2 is close to one and dominates any other terms in the regression,
including alternative proxy variables (e.g., pro¯tability, marginal tax rate, etc.) used
in an expanded speci¯cation. Thus, Welch concludes that ¯rms fail to rebalance their
capital structures, even over horizons as long as ¯ve years.
However, similar to market timing, the inertia theory is predicated on the persistence
in leverage. And, as discussed before, persistence in leverage is insu±cient to reject
trade-o® behavior. The remainder of this subsection sets out to distinguish the trade-o®
behavior examined in this paper from the inertia theory.
B.1. The Response to Large Equity Shocks
Our ¯rst examination is very similar to that presented in Figure 4. Using an annual
COMPUSTAT sample selected to match the one used in Welch (2004), we stratify the
sample each year into four portfolios based on ¯rm size and market-to-book medians.33
We then compare the average leverage of those ¯rms that experience a \large" positive
(negative) equity shock, de¯ned as an equity return at least one standard deviation
above (below) the ¯rm-speci¯c average return, to those that did not.34 We perform the
33To ensure that our sample closely resembles that used by Welch (2004), we closely reproduce a
number of his results.
34We also alter the de¯nition of a large equity shock to coincide with a 1.5 and 2 standard deviation
return with little e®ect on our results.
32comparison in the year preceding the shock (period \Pre"), the year of the shock (period
0), and the following ¯ve years. Panel A of Figure 6 looks at the response to positive
equity shocks; panel C of Figure 6 looks at the response to negative equity shocks.
Several observations are worth noting. First, leverage noticeably decreases (increases)
in response to the positive (negative) equity shock during the year of the shock suggesting
that ¯rms do not respond simultaneously with the shock. Implicit in Welch's empirical
test (equation (6)) is the assumption that ¯rms respond simultaneously to equity shocks,
thereby immediately returning their leverage to its pre-shock level (last period's leverage).
Hence, Figure 6 illustrates why ^ ®2 is approximately equal to 1 and ^ ®1 approximately
equal to 0 in equation (6). Second, the response to equity shocks is gradual, in the sense
that more and more ¯rms respond over the subsequent ¯ve years. This fact explains
why ^ ®2 attenuates and ^ ®1 increases as k, the time between periods, increases. As time
goes by since the equity shock, the leverage of those experiencing the shock approaches
the leverage of those that did not (i.e. the control group). This result highlights the
persistence, on which the inertia theory is predicated. The response to equity shocks
occurs gradually over time.
However, Panels A and C clearly show a response to the equity shock. Panels B
and D of Figure 6 con¯rm that the leverage adjustment is the result of ¯rms actively
responding to the equity shock via debt policy. Firms experiencing a positive shock are
more likely to subsequently issue debt (Panel B), while ¯rms experiencing a negative
shock are more likely to subsequently retire debt (Panel D). Thus, Figure 6 illustrates
that ¯rms do indeed respond to equity shocks in so far as they impact leverage, consistent
with the ¯ndings in Table IV.
B.2. Simulated Trade-o® Data
Because the speci¯cation in equation (6) requires knowledge of only debt and equity val-
ues, along with capital gains, we are able to estimate the model using data simulated from
the trade-o® model of Fischer et al. (1989). More speci¯cally, we simulate 100 annual
observations of debt and equity values using their model with the following parameter
values: a corporate tax rate of 50%, a personal tax rate of 35%, an asset value variance
of 5%, a transaction cost of 1%, a riskless interest rate of 2%, and a fractional value loss
in bankruptcy of 20%. All of these parameters are \base case" values, except for the
cost of bankruptcy (base case value of 5%). We employ their model under this higher
bankruptcy cost in order to ensure that leverage adjustments occur in both directions
(increases and decreases), which is consistent with the data.
33Using the simulated debt and equity data, the model in equation (6) is estimated
using OLS. This procedure of simulating data and estimating equation (6) is repeated
500 times, producing a series of parameter estimates (®0;®1;®2) and R-squareds (R2).
Table VII presents the means of the parameters and R-squareds. Also presented is a
reproduction of the results from Panel B of Table 3 in Welch (2004). Immediately clear
is the similarity of the results generated from the simulated data and that from the actual
data used by Welch. For the one-period regression, ®2 is approximately one and ®1 is
negative and much smaller in magnitude. The intercept and ®1 both increase with the
horizon, while ®2 and the R-squared decrease with the horizon.
In fact, the only distinction is that the magnitude of the coe±cients and R-squareds
corresponding to the simulated data are lower than those for the actual data at longer
horizons. This di®erence is due to greater persistence in the actual data relative to
the simulated data and is unsurprising when considered in the context of our results
on adjustment costs. We showed earlier that leverage behaves as though ¯rms face
adjustment costs, debt issuance costs in particular, that are likely comprised of ¯xed and
convex cost components. Thus, the actual leverage data resembles that shown in Panel
C in ¯gure 1. The simulated data is generated assuming a ¯xed cost and thus resembles
that shown in Panel A. The relevant distinction between these two processes is that the
simulated data exhibits less persistence than the actual data, so that shocks dissipate
more quickly in the simulated data. Hence, the parameter estimates (and R-squareds)
based on the simulated data decline more rapidly than those using the actual data.
C. The Pecking Order
The pecking order, formalized by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), states
that ¯rms have a preference ranking over sources of funds for ¯nancing based on the
corresponding information asymmetry costs. Internal funds avoid such costs entirely
and, as such, are at the bottom of the pecking order. This source is followed by riskless
and then risky debt. Finally, equity is at the top of the pecking order as a residual source
of ¯nancing.
Table IV shows two key results consistent with this theory. First, ¯rms with large
internal equity or large cash balances are less likely to use external ¯nancing. This
result is represented by the negative coe±cients on the Cash and Pro¯tability variables
in the debt and equity issuance models. Second, ¯rms with large capital expenditures
(CapEx(t+1)) are more likely to issue debt or equity. Further, the negative coe±cient
34on pro¯tability in the debt issuance model casts some doubt on the traditional static
trade-o® view that ¯rms use debt as a tax shield for operating pro¯ts or to mitigate free
cash-°ow problems.
These results are, perhaps, not surprising given the history of empirical evidence con-
sistent with aspects of both the trade-o® and pecking order theories (e.g. Titman and
Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002)). Though typically viewed as competing
theories, the trade-o® and pecking order do share some theoretical commonalities, par-
ticularly when one considers the \modi¯ed" pecking order described in the conclusion of
Myers (1984). In this version, Myers notes that ¯rms take into account the ¯nancial dis-
tress costs of debt ¯nancing with the information asymmetry costs of equity ¯nancing.
Recent empirical evidence (Shyam-sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender
(2002)) tends to support this version of the pecking order.
The modi¯ed pecking order and the trade-o® model examined here have similar pre-
dictions for the dynamics of capital structure adjustments. As leverage increases, ¯rms
are more likely to issue equity or repurchase debt to avoid bankruptcy costs and preserve
future debt capacity, but don't do so immediately due to the costs of the adjustment.
Similarly, as leverage decreases, debt capacity increases. Firms are then more likely to
fund investment opportunities by issuing debt, but may still refrain from doing so (by
using internally generated funds) due to the direct costs (and information costs in the
case of risky debt) of external security issuance. Our tests, being primarily designed to
detect such rebalancing behavior, have low power to distinguish this scenario from a more
traditional tax-bankruptcy cost tradeo® model. Thus, while our results suggest that in-
formation asymmetry costs may be an important concern in ¯rms' ¯nancing decisions,
future research focused explicitly on the predictions of the pecking order are required for
a clearer distinction between the pecking order and traditional trade-o® theories.
VI. Conclusion
We analyze whether corporate ¯nancial policy is consistent with the trade-o® theory, after
accounting for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that ¯rms tend to make capital
structure adjustments relatively infrequently (on average once a year) but in clusters.
This temporal pattern in ¯nancing decisions is largely consistent with the direct evidence
describing the adjustment costs associated with ¯nancing decisions.
Motivated by the theoretical framework of Fischer et al. (1989), we illustrate how
shocks to leverage can have a persistent e®ect when ¯rms are faced with adjustment
35costs, implying that leverage is a noisy measure of ¯rms' ¯nancial policies. We then
specify a dynamic duration model of ¯rms ¯nancing decisions, in order to understand
the motivation behind actual leverage adjustments (i.e. why do ¯rms adjust when they
do). Our results are strongly supportive of a rebalancing e®ort by ¯rms, consistent
with a dynamic trade-o® theory. However, our results are inconsistent with the market
timing and inertia theories, both of which are predicated in large part on the persistence
of the leverage process. Firms do indeed respond to equity issuances and equity price
shocks by appropriately rebalancing their leverage over the next one to four years. Thus,
the persistent e®ect of shocks on leverage documented by previous studies (e.g., Baker
and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004)) is more likely due to optimizing behavior in the
presence of adjustment costs, as opposed to market timing or indi®erence.
Interestingly, we also ¯nd evidence consistent with the predictions of the pecking order
in that ¯rms are less likely to utilize external capital markets when they have su±cient
internal funds, but are more likely when they have large investment needs. Thus, while
¯rms appear to follow a dynamic rebalancing strategy, information asymmetry costs may
be an important determinant in their ¯nancing decision. However, since our tests are
designed primarily to detect rebalancing behavior, as opposed to distinguish trade-o®
and pecking order behavior, further work on this distinction is needed.
36Appendix: Likelihood Function
Let Tij be a random variable corresponding to the duration of the jth capital structure
adjustment for ¯rm i and de¯ne Fij(t) and fij(t) to be the corresponding distribution and
density functions, respectively. Also de¯ne the survival function, Sij(t) = 1¡Fij(t), and
note that, from the de¯nition of the hazard function in equation (1), hij(t) = fij(t)=Sij(t).
The survivor function will prove useful in expressing the likelihood function.
Recall the conditional hazard speci¯cation in equation (2):
hij(tj!i) = !ih0(t)expfxij(t)
0
¯g; (7)
where !i is a random variable representing unobserved heterogeneity, h0(t) is a step
function referred to as the baseline hazard, xij(t) is a vector of covariates and ¯ is an
unknown parameter vector. To ease the discussion, we de¯ne hij(t) = h0(t)expfxij(t)
0¯g,
which enables us to write the conditional hazard more compactly as
hij(tj!i) = !ihij(t): (8)
From their de¯nitions, the hazard and survival functions are related by:
hij(tj!i) =
¡dlnSij(tj!i)
dt
: (9)
Given this relation,
Sij(tj!i) = exp
½Z t
0
hij(uj!i)du
¾
= exp
½
¡!i
Z t
0
fij(u)
Sij(u)
du
¾
= [Sij(t)]
!i (10)
where Sij(t) is the survival function corresponding to hij(t).
To obtain the likelihood function, we compute the ¯rm-level conditional likelihoods
and then integrate out the random variable !i. Assume that we have i = 1;:::;N ¯rms,
each with j = 1;:::;ni observations consisting of a start time (t0ij), an end time (tij), and
a adjustment indicator:
dij =
(
1 if adjustment occurs
0 if censored
(11)
37Note that while a ¯nancing duration may last several quarters, for the purpose of esti-
mation we model each observation as a separate duration that either ends in a ¯nancing
spike, in which case dij = 1, or is censored, in which case dij = 0. This allows us to use
information on the complete time path of covariates in our estimation. Though not ex-
plicit, the hazard and survival functions are both conditional on the observed covariates,
xij(t).
The conditional likelihood contribution of the jth spell for the ith ¯rm is given by
Lij(!i) =
Sij(tijj!i)
Sij(t0ijj!i)
hij(tijj!i)
dij
=
·
Sij(tij)
Sij(t0ij)
¸!i
[!ihij(tij)]
dij (12)
where the second equality follows from the relation in equation (10). Conditional on the
unobserved heterogeneity, each observation for the ith ¯rm is independent. Thus, the
likelihood contribution for the ith ¯rm, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, is:
Li(!i) =
ni Y
j=1
·
Sij(tij)
Sij(t0ij)
¸!i
[!ihij(tij)]
dij (13)
The unconditional likelihood function for the ith ¯rm is
Li =
Z
Li(!i)dG(!i); (14)
where G(!i) is the distribution function of !i. When G(!i) is a gamma distribution with
mean one and variance µ, the unconditional log-likelihood contribution for the ith ¯rm is
equal to35
lnLi =
ni X
j=1
dij lnhij(tij) ¡ (µ
¡1 + Di)ln
"
1 ¡ µ
ni X
j=1
ln
Sij(tij)
Sij(t0ij)
#
+ Di lnµ + ln¡(µ
¡1 + Di) ¡ ln¡(µ
¡1) (15)
where Di =
Pni
j=1 is the number of adjustments made by ¯rm i and ¡(¢) is the gamma
function. When we assume that !i is distributed inverse Gaussian with a mean of one
and variance of µ, the unconditional log-likelihood contribution of the ith ¯rm is
lnLi = µ
¡1 ¡
1 ¡ R
¡1
i
¢
+ B(µRi;Di) +
ni X
j=1
dij [lnhij(tij)lnRi] (16)
35See Gutierrez (2002).
38where
Ri =
"
1 ¡ 2µ
ni X
j=1
ln
Sij(tij)
Sij(t0ij)
#0:5
and B(x;y) is de¯ned as
B(x;y) = x
¡1 + 0:5
£
ln(2¼
¡1) ¡ ln(x)
¤
+ ln
¡
Bk(0:5 ¡ y;x
¡1)
¢
:
Bk(a;b) is known as the BesselK function (see Wolfram (1999)). The complete uncon-
ditional log-likelihood is obtained by simply summing equation (15) or (16) over the i
¯rms.
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45Table II
Capital Structure Adjustment Magnitudes
The sample consists of quarterly COMPUSTAT data from 1984 to 2001 and is restricted to ¯rms with
at least four years of contiguous data and no missing values for equity issuances, equity repurchases,
long term debt, short term debt or book assets. Financial ¯rms (SICs 6000-6999) and utilities (SICs
4900-4999) are excluded. The table presents summary information on the magnitude of four basic
¯nancing spikes: Debt Issue, Debt Retirement, Equity Issue, and Equity Repurchase, each de¯ned as
a net security issuance or repurchase of at least 5% of book assets. All dollar values are in millions
and in°ation adjusted to 2001 dollars using the all urban CPI. The top one percentile of each variable's
distribution is trimmed.
Median Mean Std Dev
Debt Issue Issue Size 7.81 54.48 147.66
Book Assets 76.33 504.03 1491.57
Issue Size / Book Assets 0.0967 0.1562 0.1677
Issue Size / Market Capitalization 0.1233 0.2278 0.3256
Debt Retirement Retirement Size 6.62 44.42 120.06
Book Assets 66.12 498.93 1534.71
Retirement Size / Book Assets 0.0898 0.1314 0.1192
Retirement Size / Market Capitalization 0.1521 0.4021 0.8259
Equity Issue Issue Size 3.55 19.93 42.42
Book Assets 15.14 154.03 597.65
Issue Size / Book Assets 0.1968 0.4076 0.5832
Issue Size / Market Capitalization 0.0907 0.1426 0.1655
Equity Repurchase Repurchase Size 11.20 55.90 112.46
Book Assets 348.22 1661.63 3142.95
Repurchase Size / Book Assets 0.0253 0.0365 0.0322
Repurchase Size / Market Capitalization 0.0209 0.0321 0.0353
46Table III
Summary Statistics of Financing Decision Determinants
The sample consists of quarterly COMPUSTAT data from 1984 to 2001 and is restricted to ¯rms with
at least four years of contiguous data and no missing values for equity issuances, equity repurchases,
long term debt, short term debt or book assets. Financial ¯rms (SICs 6000-6999) and utilities (SICs
4900-4999) are excluded. All variables are expressed in percentages (except MA/BA and Z-Score) and
are normalized by the contemporaneous book value of total assets unless otherwise noted. MA/BA
is the ratio of the book value of assets minus book equity plus market equity to the book value of
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.
Size is the ratio of sales for ¯rm i in quarter t to the sum of sales for all ¯rms in quarter t. CapEx
is capital expenditures. Cash is cash and short-term marketable securities. DepAmort is depreciation
and amortization. Tangibility is physical plant, property and equipment. Pro¯tability is net operating
income. Selling Expense is selling expenses as a fraction of sales. Volatility is the absolute value of the
change in net income. Z-Score is the sum of 3.3 times earnings before interest and taxes plus sales plus
1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital, all divided by total assets. Equity Return is
the cumulative four-quarter stock return. Underwriter Spreads are calculated using estimated equations
for debt and equity issuance spreads from Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). Turnover is the maximum daily
share turnover during the quarter. Leverage is restricted to lie in the unit interval. MA/BA is restricted
to be less than 10. The upper and lower one-percentiles of all other variables are trimmed.
Variables Median Mean Standard Deviation
MA / BA 1.36 1.84 1.38
Leverage 17.91 24.80 24.45
Size 0.008 0.058 0.197
CapEx 1.14 1.75 1.99
Cash 5.54 13.46 17.84
DepAmort 1.18 1.37 0.91
Tangibility 25.61 31.45 22.70
Pro¯tability 3.04 1.87 5.77
Selling Expense 23.74 31.51 32.76
Volatility 0.86 2.05 3.45
Z-Score 0.91 0.37 2.14
Equity Return 1.00 8.58 52.55
Underwriter Spread (Debt Issuance) 5.71 21.82 148.12
Underwriter Spread (Equity Issuance) 10.92 34.34 105.12
Turnover 1.50 3.10 8.00
47Table IV
Determinants of Financing Decisions
The sample consists of quarterly COMPUSTAT data from 1984 to 2001 and is restricted to ¯rms with
at least four years of contiguous data and no missing values for equity issuances, equity repurchases,
long term debt, short term debt or book assets. Financial ¯rms (SICs 6000-6999) and utilities (SICs
4900-4999) are excluded. All variables are normalized by total assets and measured at time t¡1 unless
otherwise noted. Size is the ratio of sales for ¯rm i in quarter t to the sum of sales for all ¯rms in quarter
t. MA/BA is the ratio of total assets minus book equity plus market equity to total assets. CapEx (t+1)
is capital expenditures in quarter t+1. Cash is cash and short-term marketable securities. DepAmort is
depreciation and amortization. Tangibility is the value of tangible assets. Pro¯tability is net operating
income. Volatility is the absolute value of the change in net income. Z-Score is the sum of 3.3 times
earnings before interest and taxes plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working
capital, all divided by total assets. Selling Expense is selling expenses as a fraction of sales. Equity
Return is the cumulative four-quarter stock return. ¢Leverage is the change in leverage. Leverage is
the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. LeverDown is a binary
variable equal to one after a leverage decreasing event occurs during a spell. LeverUp is a binary variable
equal to one after a leverage increasing event occurs during a spell. Estimated Spreads represents the
estimated underwriter spread for the issuance that ends each spell, calculated using estimated equations
for debt and equity issuance spreads from Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). For right censored spells, this is
replaced by the estimated spread for the issuance or repurchase that ended the previous spell; Turnover
is the maximum daily turnover during the quarter. Binary variables corresponding to years, quarters and
2-digit SIC codes are included in the estimation but not reported. The hazard impact (HI) is de¯ned
as: 100 £ (expf¯g ¡ 1), where ¯ is the estimated coe±cient, and measures the percentage shift in the
hazard curve due to a 1-unit change in the covariate. t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the
corresponding estimate. Statistical signi¯cance at the 1% (5%) level is indicated by two (one) asterisks.
48Panel A: Leverage Adjustments
Leverage Increase Leverage Decrease
Coe±cient Estimate HI (%) Estimate HI (%)
Size -0.0031** -0.31 -0.0094** -0.94
(-2.72) (-5.03)
MA / BA 0.0379* 3.87 0.1868** 20.54
(2.5) (13.06)
CapEx (t+1) 0.0804** 8.37 0.0021 0.21
(15.64) (0.27)
Cash -0.0278** -2.74 -0.0152** -1.51
(-17.67) (-9.85)
DepAmort -0.06** -5.82 0.0417 4.26
(-2.94) (1.92)
Tangibility -0.0034** -0.34 -0.0116** -1.16
(-3.27) (-9.27)
Pro¯tability -0.0245** -2.42 -0.0004 -0.04
(-5.29) (-0.1)
Volatility 0.0072 0.72 0.0221** 2.24
(1.42) (4.53)
Z score 0.0000 0.00 -0.0008** -0.08
(0.24) (-6.6)
Selling Expense 0.0004 0.04 0.0013* 0.13
(0.62) (2.01)
Equity Return 0.0004 0.04 0.0023** 0.23
(1.37) (8.05)
¢ Leverage -0.0057** -0.57 0.0057** 0.57
(-2.94) (2.82)
Leverage -0.0076** -0.76 0.0159** 1.60
(-8.83) (18.02)
LeverDown 0.3855** 47.03
(12.03)
LeverUp 0.5023** 65.26
(12.77)
49Panel B: Basic Financing Spikes
Debt Issuance Equity Issuance Debt Retirement Equity Repurchase
Coe±cient Estimate HI (%) Estimate HI (%) Estimate HI (%) Estimate HI (%)
Size -0.0079** -0.79 -0.0358** -3.52 -0.0073** -0.73 0.0063** 0.63
(-5.64) (-4.62) (-3.55) (5.21)
MA / BA 0.0206 2.08 0.1934** 21.33 0.1098** 11.61 0.0431 4.40
(1.29) (10.28) (5.03) (1.64)
CapEx (t+1) 0.0869** 9.08 0.0499** 5.12 -0.0287** -2.83 -0.0374* -3.67
(16.83) (5.08) (-2.76) (-2.53)
Cash -0.0359** -3.52 -0.0161** -1.59 -0.0204** -2.02 0.0084** 0.84
(-19.93) (-7.1) (-8.97) (4.43)
DepAmort -0.06** -5.82 0.0717* 7.43 0.0241 2.44 -0.0138 -1.37
(-2.9) (2.09) (0.88) (-0.32)
Tangibility -0.004** -0.40 -0.0054* -0.54 -0.0134** -1.33 0.0032 0.32
(-3.75) (-2.55) (-8.77) (1.55)
Pro¯tability -0.0313** -3.08 -0.0265** -2.62 0.0129* 1.30 0.0305* 3.10
(-6.82) (-3.7) (2.19) (2.4)
Volatility 0.0029 0.29 -0.0063 -0.62 0.0357** 3.64 0.0065 0.65
(0.56) (-0.72) (6.13) (0.51)
Z-score -0.0003* -0.03 -0.0012** -0.12 -0.0004* -0.04 0.0015** 0.15
(-2.38) (-6.91) (-2.19) (3.12)
Sell Exp 0.0007 0.07 0.0004 0.04 0.0002 0.02 -0.004* -0.40
(1.16) (0.48) (0.21) (-2.28)
Equity Return 0.0009** 0.09 0.0051** 0.52 0.0015** 0.15 -0.0014** -0.14
(3.48) (11.28) (4.21) (-2.59)
¢ Leverage -0.0044* -0.44 -0.0071 -0.71 0.0063** 0.63 -0.0024 -0.24
(-2.26) (-1.65) (2.79) (-0.49)
Leverage -0.0081** -0.80 0.0020 0.20 0.0181** 1.83 -0.018** -1.78
(-9.07) (1.06) (17.01) (-8.95)
LeverDown 0.3675** 44.41 -0.0177 -1.76
(11.41) (-0.34)
LeverUp 0.2525** 28.73 0.5439** 72.28
(3.68) (12.24)
Estimated Spread -0.0018** -0.18 0.0027** 0.27
(-2.96) (3.23)
Turnover 0.0004 0.04
(1.43)
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51Table VI
The E®ect of Market Timing on Financing Decisions
The sample consists of quarterly COMPUSTAT data from 1984 to 2001 and is restricted to ¯rms with
at least four years of contiguous data and no missing values for equity issuances, equity repurchases,
long term debt, short term debt or book assets. Financial ¯rms (SICs 6000-6999) and utilities (SICs
4900-4999) are excluded. All variables are normalized by total assets and measured at time t¡1 unless
otherwise noted. Equity Return is the cumulative four-quarter stock return. ¢Leverage is the change
in leverage. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.
StockIss is a binary variable equal to one for the period after a stock issuance event occurs during a spell.
EFWA is the external ¯nance weighted average market-to-book ratio, de¯ned as in Baker and Wurgler
(2002). The following variables are not presented in the table, but are included in the model. Size is the
ratio of sales for ¯rm i in quarter t to the sum of sales for all ¯rms in quarter t. MA/BA is the ratio of
total assets minus book equity plus market equity to total assets. CapEx (t+1) is capital expenditures
in quarter t + 1. Cash is cash and short-term marketable securities. DepAmort is depreciation and
amortization. Tangibility is the value of tangible assets. Pro¯tability is net operating income. Volatility
is the absolute value of the change in net income. Z-Score is the sum of 3.3. times earnings before
interest and taxes plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital, all divided
by total assets. Selling Expense is selling expenses as a fraction of sales. Binary variables corresponding
to years, quarters and 2-digit SIC codes are also included. Estimated Spreads, appearing only in the
debt issuance model, represents the estimated underwriter spread for the issuance that ends each spell,
calculated using estimated equations for debt and equity issuance spreads from Altinkilic and Hansen
(2000). For right censored spells, this is replaced by the estimated spread for the issuance or repurchase
that ended the previous spell. The hazard impact (HI) is de¯ned as: 100 £ (expf¯g ¡ 1), where ¯ is
the estimated coe±cient, and measures the percentage shift in the hazard curve due to a 1-unit change
in the covariate. t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the corresponding estimate. Statistical
signi¯cance at the 1% (5%) level is indicated by two (one) asterisks.
Debt Issuance Leverage Increase
(1) (2) (3) (2)
Coe±cient Estimate HI Estimate HI Estimate HI Estimate HI
¢ Leverage -0.0081** -0.81 -0.004* -0.40 -0.0096** -0.95 -0.0052** -0.52
(-4.16) (-2.05) (-4.97) (-2.68)
Leverage -0.0093** -0.92 -0.008** -0.80 -0.0088** -0.87 -0.0078** -0.78
(-10.11) (-8.83) (-9.77) (-8.83)
StockIss 0.0778 8.09 0.0707 7.33
(1.80) (1.59)
LeverDown 0.3647** 44.01 0.3821** 46.53
(11.31) (11.88)
EFWA -0.0049 -0.49 -0.0205 -2.03
(-0.21) (-0.93)
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53Figure 1
Simulated Leverage Dynamics Under Di®erent Adjustment Cost Regimes
The ¯gure presents simulated data under three di®erent adjustment cost scenarios: ¯xed (Panel A),
proportional (Panel B), and ¯xed plus (weakly) convex (Panel C). The simulations are implemented
assuming that leverage follows a random walk in the no-recapitalization region, de¯ned by the lower
(L
¹
) and upper (¹ L) boundaries, which are chosen to be one standard deviation from the initial leverage.
The optimal recapitalization policy is determined by the assumed form of adjustment cost. The circles
correspond to periods of recapitalization. In Panel A, the dotted line (L¤) represents the (optimal) initial
value to which ¯rms recapitalize after hitting either the upper or lower boundary. In Panel C, the dotted
lines, ¹ L¤ and L
¹
¤, correspond to the optimal leverage after recapitalizations resulting from hitting the
upper and lower boundary, respectively.
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54Figure 2
Simulated Hazard Curves Under Di®erent Adjustment Cost Regimes
The ¯gure presents hazard curves estimated from simulated data under three di®erent adjustment cost
regimes: ¯xed (Panel A), proportional (Panel B), and ¯xed plus (weakly) convex (Panel C). The simu-
lations are implemented assuming that leverage follows a random walk in the no recapitalization region
and that the optimal control policy is undertaken at each recapitalization point (see Figure I for an
illustration of the resulting leverage dynamics). For each cost regime, 100 paths of 100 observations
are simulated. The hazard curve for leverage increasing adjustments is then parameterized as a cubic
polynomial and estimated via maximum likelihood, assuming that the durations are independent and
exponentially distributed. Estimated hazard curves for leverage decreasing adjustmentes yield similar
results.
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55Figure 3
Estimated Hazard Curves
The sample consists of quarterly COMPUSTAT data from 1984 to 2001 and is restricted to ¯rms with
at least four years of contiguous data and no missing values for equity issuances, equity repurchases,
long term debt, short term debt or book assets. Financial ¯rms (SICs 6000-6999) and utilities (SICs
4900-4999) are excluded. The four basic ¯nancing spikes (Debt Issue, Debt Retirement, Equity Issue,
Equity Repurchase) are de¯ned as a net security issuance or repurchase of at least 5% of book assets.
The two leverage adjustments (Leverage Increase and Leverage Decrease) are de¯ned as a di®erence in
net debt issued and net equity issued that is greater in magnitude than 5% of book assets. The ¯gures
present estimates of the baseline hazard curve. The jagged curve presents the step function estimate.
The smooth curve presents the cubic polynomial estimate, the parameters and t-stats of which are
presented in the accompanying boxes.
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56Figure 4
Response to Equity Issuances
The sample is selected from annual COMPUSTAT data in a manner consistent with Baker and Wurgler
(2002). Speci¯cally, we start with all non-¯nancial, non-utility ¯rms listed on COMPUSTAT prior to
2000 and drop ¯rms with missing values for book assets or with a minimum value for book assets of less
than $10 million. Each year, the entire sample is strati¯ed into four portfolios based on the median asset
size (big and small) and median market-to-book ratio (high and low) of the ¯rm. Within each of these
portfolios, the sample is split between those ¯rms that issued equity and those that did not. Holding
the ¯rms in these portfolios constant, we track the average di®erence between the market leverage of
the issuers and non-issuers over the next ¯ve years. To clarify, in 1990, for example, we form four
size/market-to-book portfolios based on ¯rm characteristics at the end of 1989 and compute the average
di®erence in leverage between those ¯rms that issued equity in 1990 and those that did not within each
of the four portfolios. We then follow these same portfolios of ¯rms over the next ¯ve years (and previous
year), recomputing the di®erence in the leverage at each point in time. We repeat this exercise for each
year from 1975 through 1995 and then average across event times (i.e. start of the issue period, end of
the issue period, one year after the issue period, etc.). These results are presented in Panel A. Panel B
presents the di®erence of the fraction of ¯rms among the equity issuers and non-issuers that subsequently
issue debt.
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57Figure 5
The Leverage of High and Low EFWA Firms
The sample is selected from annual COMPUSTAT data in a manner consistent with Baker and Wurgler
(2002). Speci¯cally, we start with all non-¯nancial, non-utility ¯rms listed on COMPUSTAT prior to
2000 and drop ¯rms with missing values for Book Assets or with a minimum value for Book Assets of less
than $10 million. Each year, the entire sample is strati¯ed into four portfolios based on the median asset
size of the ¯rm (big and small) and the median market-to-book ratio of the ¯rm (high and low). Within
each of these four portfolios, the sample is split between those ¯rms with a high and low (above and
below median) lagged value for Baker and Wurgler's (2002) external ¯nance weighted average market-to-
book (EFWA). Holding ¯rms in the four size/market-to-book portfolios constant, we track the average
di®erence between the market leverage of these two groups within each of the four portfolios over the
next four years. To clarify, in 1990, for example, we form four size/market-to-book portfolios based on
¯rm characteristics at the end of 1989 and compute the average di®erence in leverage between the high
and low EFWA ¯rms in each of the four portfolios. We then follow these same portfolios of ¯rms over
the next four years, recomputing the di®erence in the leverage at each point in time. We repeat this
exercise for each year from 1975 through 1995 and then average across event times. These results are
presented in Panel A. Panels B, C and D replicate the analysis of Panel A, only comparing the leverage
of groups distinguished by the average of their historical market-to-book values (high versus low), the
number of times per year they have issued equity in the past (many versus few), and the average size of
past equity issuances relative to book assets (large versus small). We use medians to distinguish between
groups within each portfolio.
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59Figure 6
Response to Equity Shocks
The sample is selected from annual COMPUSTAT data in a manner consistent with Welch (2004).
Speci¯cally, we start with all non-¯nancial, non-utility ¯rms listed on both COMPUSTAT and CRSP
from 1962 to 2000 and exclude those ¯rm-years for which the market value of equity at the beginning
of the year is less than the level of the S&P 500 Index divided by 10 (in $ millions). Each year, the
entire sample is strati¯ed into four portfolios based on the median asset size (big and small) and median
market-to-book ratio (high and low) of the ¯rm. Within each of these portfolios, the sample is split
between those ¯rms that experience a positive (negative) equity shock and those that did not, where
a shock is de¯ned as an equity return at least one standard deviation above (below) the ¯rm-speci¯c
mean. Holding the ¯rms in these portfolios constant, we track the average di®erence between the market
leverage of these two groups within each of the four portfolios over the next ¯ve years (and previous
year). To clarify, in 1990, for example, we form four size/market-to-book portfolios based on ¯rm
characteristics at the end of 1989 and compute the average di®erence in leverage between ¯rms that
experience a positive (negative) shock in 1990 and those that did not in each of the four portfolios. We
then follow these same portfolios of ¯rms over the next ¯ve years (and previous year), recomputing the
di®erence in the leverage at each point in time. We repeat this exercise for each year from 1975 through
1995 and then average across event times (i.e. year prior to shock, year of the shock, one year after the
shock, etc.). The results for positive (negative) shocks are presented in Panel A (C). Panel B presents the
di®erence in the fraction of ¯rms that do (do not) experience a positive equity shock and subsequently
issue debt. Panel D presents the di®erence in the fraction of ¯rms that do (do not) experience a negative
equity shock and that subsequently retire debt.
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